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LOCAL GOVERNMENTS AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF RURAL ENTERPRISES: 
A CASE STUDY OF ZHONGSHAN CITY, 1978-1990 
Rural enterprises have increasingly achieved a remarkable result in the rural economic reform in Post-Mao era. Simultaneously, local governments have played an influential role in promoting the development of rural enterprises. 
This thesis aims to investigate the relationships between local govern-
ments and the development of rural enterprises in 1978-1990. The research is 
conducted in the form of an indepth case study. Zhongshan City, one of the 
rapidly developing regions in the Pearl River Delta, is selected as a case. A 
comparative approach is adopted to explain the different treatments between 
collective and private enterprises in rural areas. Not many studies have been 
done on this aspect. 
The major research questions in this thesis are 1) to identify the 
development pattern of rural enterprises in Zhongshan in the period studied, 2) 
to explain why local governments support such a development pattern, and 3) to 
discuss how local governments influence the development pattern by policy 
implementation. 
The results of this research show that the collective sector economically 
predominated over private sector in the market throughout the period studied. 
Local governments have strongly supported this pattern which satisfies the 
interests of local governments and the affluence of the locality. Moreover, 
promoting the collective sector is always ideologically compatible to Mainland 
China. Such a development pattern is mainly caused by "tilt policies" 
implemented by local governments. By a comparative analysis on five aspects 
of policies including license, finance, resource allocation, employee and 
marketing, it is found that the policies have favored collective enterprises and 
discriminated against private ones. 
Through this study, a deeper understanding on the relationship between the development of rural enterprises and the roles of local governments is reached. In this rapid changing environment of rural China, the author offers more background information and generates new insights to those interested for further studies. 
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China has achieved significant performance in rural economic 
development. Many scholars have investigated this area from different 
perspectives. They offer their ideas on interrelationships between central and 
V local governments, state and society, governments and enterprises. 
Regarding the state and society relationship, there is a vigorous debate 
among scholars of Chinese politics. Focusing on the capacity of the state to 
penetrate, regulate, and extract resources from townships and villages, Vivienne 
Shue (1988) views the late Maoist era as characterized by pervasive localism: 
local cadres aggressively pursued the development of commune and brigade 
enterprises to increase their own control over financial and material resources, 
often in conflict with central government plan priorities. However, she 
hypothesizes that in the reform era，the expansion of market forces and the 
separation of political, economic, and social authority will allow the state to 
penetrate local society and to tap its resources more effectively. ^  
In contrast, Helen Siu (1989a) portrays communes and brigades in the 
late Maoist era differently than Shue does. She thinks reforms have very 
different consequences. Siu uses the notion of "state involution" to describe 
changes at the local level during the reform era.^ This notion suggests that 
local cadres, who served as agents of the state in the pre-reform era, will now 
use their positions in political structure to maintain their power, running against 
the liberalizing goals of the state.^ Similarly, Jean Oi (1989) describes the 
perpetuation of a clientist system at the local level in which cadres manipulate 
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state polices to their own advantage, making the central state more difficult in 
controlling local communities, 
Zhao Suishen (1990) adds that local government adjusts or ignores 
central policies which run against local interests, and deviates from central 
polices in ways which favor local interests of implementators while the central 
authority lacks effective control.5 David Zweig (1989) also claims that the 
administration supported by local cadres for local entrepreneurship may be 
motivated by their desire to build a resource base which will increase their 
bargaining powers vis-a-vis higher level.^ Therefore, Lampton suggests that 
i various tactics and tradeoffs will be adopted by local governments to enhance 
their bargaining powers.? Local government has undoubtedly played a crucial 
role in the development of rural enterprises. The above argument exists over 
the abi l i ty of the state to get suppor t in the face of an increasingly 
entrepreneurial local society oriented toward production for the market. Perkins 
(1988)，however, argues that if profits are raised through bargaining with 
bureaucracy for preferential treatments, Chinese enterprises are operating in a 
bureaucratic rather than a market environment.^ Ody (1992) affirms Perkins' 
view that the market environment is still immature for Chinese rural enterprise 
development and no true privatization exists in China's economic system.^ 
Some scholars propose that China is turning into the phenomenon of 
strong society and weak state. Jean Oi (1992)，however, argues that local 
governments would cont inue to be strong and e f fec t ive as the rural 
industrialization reached to a higher level.^^ The role of local government 
remains important in terms of factory management, resource allocation, 
bureaucratic services, investment and credit while the central government's 
authority seems less penetrating into the local enterprise units. Regarding the 
local government and enterprise relation Jean Oi believes that local governments 
can boost up the local economy through rural col lect ive enterpr ise 
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development.il 
Liu Yia-ling (1992), however, offers a different argument to the success 
of local economy in Wenzhou. She believed that this is the credit of private 
enterprises but local governments do not contribute much to help private 
enterprises in rural industrialization. 12 
Fei Xiaotong (1986) finds out that the emergence of rural enterprises has 
been an unintended consequence of economic and social evolution in China. In 
the early stage, the state has never predicted that rural enterprises would become 
an influential economic power.丄； 
� According to Song Una and Du He (1990)，local governments take a 
twofold role - as community administrator and as enterprise owner. The 
behavior of local government cadres always carry twofold objectives: to 
perform duties and to maximize their own interests. The dual roles usually 
come into conflict with each other. When this happens, local governments 
neglect their role as enterprise owner and perform their administrative duty. 
Sometimes it is difficult but necessary for local governments to balance and 
compromise their different roles on rural enterprise development.丄斗 
Lina (1990) makes a comparison between collective enterprises and local 
state enterprises. She discovers that the two kinds of ownership share quite a lot 
of similarities in terms of structure and administration. A kinship relation, just 
like parent and children, exist between them. Both have ownership rights over 
the assets of the firms under their jurisdiction. Both provides various kinds of 
preferential treatments to their enterprises.^^ 
Dong (1987) argues that it is problematic for enterprises to follow 
traditional objectives. The state represents the common interests of society and 
sets objectives to meet common interests. Although such approach tries to 
ensure that resources will be allocated properly in the national economy, the 
control system carries several drawbacks. It constrains the enterprise's vitality 
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and creates difficulties on checking enterprises' implementation of plans. Thus, 
such a traditional approach is unrealistic and should be modified by allowing 
enterprise to have independent objectives.^^ Once enterprises become more 
autonomous, the local governments will be the ones to influence enterprises that 
are under their jurisdiction. 
Gene Tidreck (1989)，however, argues that local governments often act 
as patrons rather than regulators. They look for ways to manipulate the rules to 
their financial advantage rather than taking the rules as given. Such a practice 
leads to collusion of interest between local governments and enterprises. 
Huang Yasheng (1990) assumes that economic bureaucrats and enterprise 
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managers dictate a pattern of mutually beneficial behavior in the Chinese 
economy. This web of interests spreads over individual sub-central units of 
local governments and enterprises. At the same time, the interest web can 
influence the decision making and policy implementation undertaken by 
economic bureaucrats and enterprises managers.^^ 
Assuming that bureaucratic leaders and factory managers are prone to 
self-interest and their actions are geared toward maximizing their own benefits, 
Andrew Walder (1986) suggests that there are three kinds of dependency on the 
enterprises: social and economic dependency on the enterprises, political 
dependency on management and personal dependency on superiors.^^ In short, 
it is the patron-client relation which involves an exchange of mutual benefits 
between parties involved. A client seeks for career advancement or gains 
access to scarce commodities by cultivating a closer tie with a Party patron who 
obtains support from below. This is similar to what Charles Lindblom calls 
"control through exchange", by which the controller gives up something to 
induce the controlled to do what he w i s h e s " . H u a n g Yasheng (1990) also 
agrees that the incentive structure in contract responsibility system is a kind of 
"give and take relation". 
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Deborah Davis, however, criticizes that Walder has exaggerated the 
primacy of patron-client ties, minimized the importance of coercion, ignored 
significant arenas of resistance to state institutions, and underestimated the 
influence of procommunist, society and culture.^^ 
The works of above scholars surveyed thus far offer rich information on 
the roles of local governments on the rural enterprise and local economic 
development. Jean Oi's framework is especially stimulating in allowing this 
study to examine ways of how local governments boost up local economy 
through the development of rural enterprises.^^ 
“ Research Scope and Problems 
Throughout history, rural market in China has experienced repression 
and revival. In the Maoist era，radical policies were implemented that 
generally restricted on individual and household autonomy. Many rural 
markets were suppressed. In 1956, less than 5 percent of retail sales in rural 
markets was left in the hands of private entrepreneurs.24 In 1960，the Central 
Committee of the Communist Party and the central government called for 
readjustment of the national economy and began to review a communization 
c a m p a i g n . T h i s led to the establishment of many commune and brigade 
enterprises (the earlier form of rural enterprises) discontinued operations. 
Until January 1978，the People's Daily carefully explained that rural 
markets should not be considered as capitalistic.^^ The current policies aimed to 
rationalize rural economic development. In the post-Mao era, individual 
households and peasants had higher autonomy to utilize their time and decide 
their own activities. As they found out they could earn more in the industrial 
sector, many people shifted from agricultural sector to industrial sector. Rural 
industrial enterprises began to resume at that time. Therefore, 1978 can be 
regarded as a watershed for rural industrialization. This year is also the starting 
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point of this study. 
China has experienced a unique rural development strategy since 1979. 
Real GNP grew more than twofold between 1978 and 1988.2? Peasant's per 
capita income increased from 133.57 to 629.79 yuan between 1978 and 1990.28 
The rural enterprise has become the greatest dynamic force in the rural 
economic reform. Local governments indeed have played a crucial role for this 
significant achievement especially when the central government has delegated 
more power to them. 
Christine Wong (1987) argues that local governments are able to behave 
in ways detrimental to central directives. If central directives adversely affect 
“ the local economy, local governments may interpret the policy or ignore it as a 
way to protect their economy. ^ ^ Vogel (1990) believes that whereas the central 
authority has provided local governments with motives to develop economically, 
especially to Guangdong province which has the privilege to progress one step 
ahead. It is the local governments which have discharged the duties and 
determined the output of the local economic reform.^^ Bryn and Lin (1990) 
added that counties in southern Guangdong Province government actively and 
vigorously promote collective and private enterprises, cooperative ventures with 
outside and foreign entrepreneurs.^^ 
In this research the relationship of these two factors, local governments 
and rural enterprises, will be the focus of analysis. Local governments refer to 
township governments and village governments in Zhongshan City, whereas 
rural enterprises refer to the collective enterprises and private enterprises in 
Zhongshan rural areas. 
Enterprises in China can be classified into three main types in terms of 
ownerships: state enterprises, collective enterprises and private enterprises. 
Although many scholars have studied the development of enterprises in China, 
few people have undertaken an indepth investigation on the development of 
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rural collective and private enterprises from a comparative perspective.^^ This 
study aims to bridge up this gap so that a more comprehensive picture on the 
development of these three main kinds of enterprises can be formulated. 
The study does not intend to look into the role of the centra l 
government. The research is to identify the features of the development pattern 
of rural enterprises in Zhongshan City. It is to investigate how local 
government policy influences rural enterprise development and why local 
governments behave in the way they do. A case study of Zhongshan City is 
adopted. 
The remaining chapters will be arranged as follows: Chapter 2 will 
provide an overview of historical background of rural enterprise development in 
Zhongshan. Chapters 3 and 4 are the core chapters which will discuss the 
influence of local government policy on the rural collective enterprises and rural 
private enterprises respectively. These two chapters will undertake a 
comparative perspective discussing five aspects, including issuing license, 
finance, resource allocation, employee and marketing. A conclusion will be 
given in the final chapter. 
Methodology and Sources 
This qualitative research is conducted in the form of a case study. The 
case being chosen is Zhongshan City whose importance can be seen in both 
geographical and historical aspects. Owing to its location near Hong Kong and 
Macau, as the birthplace of China's revolutionary pioneer, Sun Yat-sen, and 
the famous overseas Chinese's hometown in Guangdong Province, it is now 
described as an outstanding export-oriented industrializing region in the Pearl 
River Delta. In 1988，there were already more than 600,000 overseas Chinese 
and compatriots from Hong Kong, Macau and Taiwan. More than 1571 
enterprises in the form of joint ventures, co-operative ventures, sole 
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undertakings, compensation trade, processing and assembling business have been 
initiated.33 It is known as one of "four small tigers" in the Pearl River Delta.34 
This study will be limited to the discussion of the local governments, 
which refer only to the township governments and village governments in 
Zhongshan City. They are on the lowest levels of the governmental hierarchy in 
China. Viewing from the bottom can always give us a clearer picture about 
how effective the economic reform will be. As no major research on this topic 
has been conducted previously in Zhongshan City, this research can give more 
background information for those who wish to undertake research in the region. 
Documentary W)rk 
As this research adopts a qualitative approach, documentary sources 
inevitably play a crucial role. The study refers exhaustively, including county 
gazettes, archives, policy papers, local newspapers, magazines, statistical 
yearbooks, government documents, and both Chinese and Western literature. 
Using archives of local newspapers and county gazettes, a general 
development pattern of rural enterprises has been tracked out. The material 
detail the background of rural enterprise and operation of local governments in 
Zhongshan. They also provide indications on how policies were implemented 
in rural enterprises. Added with an access to quantitative data provided by 
Zhongshan Statistical Bureau and Rural Enterprise Management Bureau, a 
comparison of the development between collective enterprises and private 
enterprises can be made. Some internal publications such as "Work Bulletins” 
and "Zhongshan City Government Working Reports" were also consulted. 
Besides, the newly established Zhongshan library in 1992 allows me to 
stay in a regular place to read the secondary sources. The collection inside the 
library, however, is not rich due to its short history. The collection of journals 
and provincial newspapers located at the Universities Service Center of the 
8 
Chinese University of Hong Kong also help the research. 
Interviews 
Actually Zhongshan suffers from the paucity of publications. Primary 
sources from interviews play an important role to supplement the insufficient 
data needed in the research. Three major field studies were conducted in 
Zhongshan from 1992 to 1994. The pilot field trip took place in December 
1992 to January 1993. The second visit was made during the period between 
May and August 1993. The final supplementary field work was conducted in 
May 1994. 
Based on personal connections, most of the time of the field work was 
spent mainly on interviews with scholar, workers, collective enterprises 
managers, private entrepreneurs, local government leaders and cadres in various 
local bureaus. The cadres interviewed are from the Land Bureau, Industrial and 
Commercial Bureau, Supply and Marketing Bureau, Labor Bureau, Tax 
Bureau, Agricultural Bank and others. Furthermore, there are two associations 
in Macau named as Associate Dos Conterraneos Da Povocao De Sam Heong 
and Associacao Dos Conterraneos De Chong San which provide information and 
arrangement for necessary interviews. A list of interviewees was attached in the 
appendix of the thesis. 
To ensure satisfactory responses of interviews, a brief description about 
the research was provided to those interviewees with connections in advance, so 
that they have time to think about the topic research. In many cases, they 
devoted time to assess the research questions and provided details on the policy 
implementation in the period under study. The interview data are able to 
supplement the insufficiency of open documented materials. Furthermore, the 
field work allowed first hand observation of actual phenomenon and the 
operation of the rural enterprises. 
9 
Due to unavailability and insufficient data on the 1990s, the period 
between 1978 and 1990 can only be studied at the present. The period studied 
can be classified as three stages: recovery stage (1978-83)，rapid development 
stage (1984-88) and rectification stage (1989-90). The three stages are 
presented detailed in the following chapter. 
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Development of Rural Enterprises in Zhongshan 
An Introduction to Zhongshan City 
Zhongshan is situated in the southern part of the Pearl River Delta with 
Guangzhou to its north, the estuary of the Pearl River to the east, Jiangmen to 
its west and Zhuhai to the south, adjacent to Hong Kong and Macau. 
Zhongshan City (中山市），formerly named as Xiangshan County 
(香山縣），was built in Shaoxing twenty second year of the Southern Sung 
Dynasty (A.D.I 152). It has a history of more than 800 years.^ It was renamed 
as Zhongshan County (中山縣 ) in 1925 in commemoration of Dr. Sun Yat-
sen, the founder of the Republic of China. After liberation, with the permission 
of the State Council, it was promoted into Zhongshan City with the same 
administrative status of a county in December, 1983. In January of 1988，it was 
again upgraded into a city directly under the provincial government and 
administrative status of a prefecture.^ The city is administratively divided into 
24 townships. It covers an area of 1,683 sq. kilometers with a population of 
1.12 million in 1990. There are 9 representative offices set up by the municipal 
government in the city proper as its agencies.^ 
According to the Organic Law of the Local People's Congresses and the 
Local People's Government of the PRC, provincial cities should not have 
jurisdiction over cities incduding county level cities. However, many counties 
in Guangdong, while still not qualified to become provincial cities, would like to 
claim the status of county-level cities. The latter, according to law, should 
come under the direct jurisdiction of the province/ Among the four small 
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tigers, Nanhai and Shunde counties are under Foshan City. Dongguan and 
Zhongshan, however, had no counties under their respective jurisdictions and 
have not yet been sub-divided into districts by 1991. This phenomenon 
reflected Dongguan and Zhongshan's rapid development. They were initially 
counties, and became county-level cities in the districts. In view of their 
subsequent rapid development, with industrial output values vastly exceeding 
those of ordinary county-level cities, they were soon promoted to become 
provincial cities without counties below them.^ 
Stages of Development of Rural Enterprises 
The emergence of rural enterprises can be traced back to the early 40’s. 
They were in the form of family sideline production at that time. There were a 
few workshops and factories to produce sugar and simple handicraft items. 
They experienced a primary development into commune and brigade enterprises 
in the 50s and 60s. Nonetheless, they were severely suppressed during the 
Cultural Revolution (1966-76) (For details of events in Mao's era please refers 
to the Appendix). Rural enterprises step into a new page of development since 
1978. 
Due to a significant change in the development of rural enterprises in the 
post-Mao era，this research is to study the period from 1978 to 1990. It is 
classified into three stages in this research: recovery stage (1978-83), rapid 
development stage (1984-88) and rectification stage (1989-90). 
Recovery stage (1978-83) 
Since 1978，the constraints on nonagricultural activities had been relaxed 
to a certain extent. In 1978，the Third Plenum of the Eleventh Central 
Committee Party declared that "commune and brigade enterprises should strive 
for great development. “ These enterprises began to resume their importance in 
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the local economy. Zhongshan governments at all levels set up administrative 
bureaus to strengthen the management of these enterprises.^ 
In addition, during the Cultural Revolution, many of these enterprises 
were criticized as capitalistic and forced to stop their operation. At that time, 
many youths were sent "up the mountain and down the village" 
(上山下雍f ).7 When the Cultural Revolution was over, the youths went back 
to their hometowns where the job opportunity was still very limited. Many 
urban firms still halted their operation. The youths, many of them are skilled 
labor, set up small sideline factories by a small capital.8 These small factories 
later developed into individual proprietorship and partnership enterprises which 
become a new economic power in the rural market. 
Due to the long-term conservative ideological influences, farmers, 
however, were still insisting on the "three local trading policies (三就地 
which inevitably set up hindrance to the improvement of products. Moreover, it 
was still arguable whether the growth of rural enterprises were ideologically 
compatible to socialism at the beginning of reform and open period. In fact, 
both central and local governments did not fully support the rural enterprises at 
that time. 10 
After the introduction of "Contractual Responsibility System" (or 
Production Responsibility System), plots of land were gradually contracted to 
individual households which were allowed to retain their products after 
submitting the contracted quota to local authorities. Under a unified production 
and delivery plan, they were allowed to decide on their own schedules. The 
production of food had greatly increased.^^ 
In 1979，permission was granted to activate free rural markets within 
municipal boundaries in 1979.^^ Zhongshan government decided to adopt the 
export-oriented strategy to boost the rural economy by three major policies : (1) 
converting the local trading polices into open policy; (2) emphasizing scientific 
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management; and (3) utilizing advanced facilities and technology. Based on the 
advantages of geographical proximity, same linguistic, cultural similarities and 
overseas connection, local authorities began to develop the processing 
businesses with supplied materials, samples and designs and one compensation 
trade with Hong Kong and Macau.^^ There were 3,283 commune and brigade 
enterprises and 70,900 people engaged in 1980. The three processing 
businesses and one compensation trade (三來一補)reached 494 items and 
the foreign investment was up to 5.327 million Hong Kong dollars.^^ As 
Zhongshan government implemented the Household Responsibility System, it 
l iberal ized a large group of labor force which later contributed to the 
development of second and tertiary industries. 
Measures have been taken to separate local administration from the 
commune management in 1980. Local county governments were delegated 
power to carry out government tasks and the communes were supposed to 
specialize in handling purely economic affairs. In 1981，the State Council 
issued regulations which reaffirmed that "commune and brigade enterprises 
already constitute an important part of the rural economy, and their growth is in 
conformity with the comprehensive development of the rural economy".i5 The 
Zhongshan Government declared that "all Zhongshan citizens should put their 
effort on the team production enterprises and sideline enterprises in the same 
year. "16 In 1983，the Central Committee further confirmed that "commune and 
brigade enterprises also belong to the cooperative economy, and great efforts 
must be made to continue to consolidate and develop such enterprises/"? 
Zhongshan Government added that “ speeding up the rural production was a 
major task in the administrative agenda.“丄呂 
In short, the importance of commune and bridge enterprises were 
affirmed by both the state and Zhongshan government. 
16 
Rapid Development Stage (1984-88) 
1984 was a crucial year for the development of rural enterprises. In 
March 1984，a circular of the Central Committee and the State Council agreed 
to rename commune and brigade enterprises as township and village enterprises 
respectively. The term "commune" and "brigade" had been expunged from 
official terminology. 19 Replacing the 438 communes and brigades enterprises, 
Zhongshan was then divided into 330 townships and villages enterprises. 
The Central Committee Circular on Agriculture Work of January 1, 
supported actively the development of commune and brigade enterprises, stated 
that governments at all levels should "encourage peasants to invest in or buy 
shares of all types of enterprises and encourage collectives and peasants to pool 
their funds and jointly set up various kinds of enterprises by following the 
principle of voluntary participation and mutual benefit".21 
In addition, the new Zhongshan City Mayor Tang Bing-guan has held his 
office since 1984. He is considered as a leader who is extremely concerned 
with the rural economic development. In April of 1984，he permitted a policy 
under which "township and village enterprises could retain all the profits after 
submitting the assigned amount of taxes. "22 The townships and villages began 
to be self-responsible in terms of finance. Township and village enterprises 
started to mushroom. 
Furthermore, Central Committee Document No. l of 1984 officially 
permitted the development of private enterprises. The document said: 
According to the related policies, efforts should be made to guide 
and ensure the healthy development of private enterprises. 
Private sector should receive the same treatment as state 
enterprises and other kinds of ownerships 
A large number of private enterprises (partnerships and individual 
proprietorship) emerged at that time. Statistics showed that the number of 
private enterprises grew faster than collective enterprises from 1984 to 1988. 
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The number of rural enterprises increased rapidly at that time. 
Rural enterprises merely engaged in the processing work for large urban 
firms and state enterprises. They picked up those dealings deemed felt 
unprofitable or less profitable by large firms. As Zhongshan Harbor was 
opened in February 1985 it offered a more convenient seaway for Hong Kong 
investors to come to Zhongshan. Thereafter, large township and village 
enterprises came to a closer commercial contact with Hong Kong. The harbor 
did attract additional three processing businesses and one compensation trade. 
Besides attracting foreign investment, Zhongshan government also tried to 
establish close economic ties with neighboring cities due to its early 
development of the harbor.�* Rural enterprises began to pick up profitable 
businesses from that time onward. 
The rapid development stage was the most favorable time for both the 
collective (township and vil lage enterprises) and private ( individual 
proprietorship and partnership enterprises) sectors to grow. Since the state 
credit policy was lax, rural enterprises grasped this opportunity to expand. 
Rural enterprises grew more rapidly than ever. There were, however, tilt 
policies^^ implemented by local governments of Zhongshan on two kinds of 
ownerships. It will be detailed in the next chapter. 
Rectification Stage (1989-90) 
Entering into 1989，Zhongshan was experiencing the economic 
overheating. The state was incapable of bringing the economy under control� 
Then austerity policies were imposed by conservatives. 
During the economic rectification period, Zhongshan government 
reformulated the bank and credit loan policies to deal with the overheating 
phenomenon in which private enterprises were affected most. Basically, almost 
all enterprises were suffering from tight policies. The influence on different 
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kinds of ownerships of enterprises varied. In Zhongshan, the private sector was 
always the first one to have their loan cut off or being demanded for swift 
repayment. 26 
In Spring 1989，a large number of lay-offs appeared. 28 production lines 
came to a pause, 39 items of products were cut of f , 34.5 percent of 
infrastructure was canceled and 117 enterprises stopped their operation. 27 On 
the whole, this was the most difficult time for enterprises to cope with. 
Ownerships of Rural Enterprises 
The overv iew on the background of Zhongshan City and the 
development stages of rural enterprises can help us understand the ownerships 
of rural enterprises, which in turn is essential for us to understand the following 
chapters. 
The types of enterprises in China can be classified as state-owned 
enterprises (guoying qiye)(國營企業）’ community/collective enterprises (jtti 
qiye)(集體企業），and private enterprises (siying qiye)(私營企業）• Here 
the rural enterprises refers to collective and private enterprises at the township 
level or below. 
Legally speaking, the whole population of a township should be the 
owner of the assets of the township enterprises. Similarly, the entire population 
of a village is the owner of the assets of village enterprises. By the same token, 
several partners and individuals are the owners of the partnership enterprises 
and individual proprietorships respectively. 
This study follows the official definition of rural enterprises adopted by 
Zhongshan government. In short, rural enterprises are mainly divided into two 
types in the research: collective enterprises and private enterprises. The above 
two terms will be adopted throughout the research. Collective enterprises refer 
to township enterprises (xiangban qiye)(鎭辦企業)and village enterprises 
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(cunban qiye)(村辦企業）which are the former commune and brigade 
enterprises. Private enterprises refer to partnership enterprises (lianhu 
q i y e ) (聯戶企業 ) a n d individual proprietorships ( g e t i h u ) (個體戶 ) a n d 
production teams.^^ 
Private enterprises can have another meaning. If the partnership 
enterprises and the individual proprietorships expand to a certain scale (at least 
the fixed value over 1 million RMB), Zhongshan residents will regard them as 
private enterprises. In this study, the term private enterprises refers to the first 
meaning, i.e. partnership enterprises and individual proprietorships unless 
specified further. The term “ large private enterprises" will be used to describe 
large scale partnership enterprises and individual proprietorships. 
Comparatively speaking, in terms of administrative control, local 
governments have the right to interfere the collective enterprises in terms of 
wages, the prevalence of profit and related bonuses, the methods of appointment 
of personnel and managers, and the allocation of labor and resources. On the 
contrary, private enterprises have very high autonomy to carry out their own 
policies, to make their own decision, to recruit and hire employees freely. 
They are financially self-reliant and pay taxes to government authorities as their 
mere obligation. Since local governments have no share in the firms' assets and 
so the former would not expect much revenue from the latter. ^ ^ 
In terms of ownership, theoretically speaking, the ultimate owners of 
collective enterprises are all the peasants in the communities within which the 
enterprises operate. The initial investment must come from the savings of a 
community body. Its site must belong to a community, its production equipment 
must be the property of a community, and its distribution of profits must comply 
with regulations and remitted to corresponding authorities. The ultimate owners 
of private enterprises are individual peasants or groups of peasants. They have 
the property rights and freedom to allocate their resources.^® 
2 0 
In reality, the forms of ownership tend to be diversified. It varies 
among different regions and localities. The rights of individual members of 
rural communities are not clear-cut. e.g. public-private enterprises, collective-
private enterprises, collective enterprises leasing or contracting out to private 
management, and other forms of hybrid ownerships. At the end of eighties, the 
types of ownership become more complex. Many rural enterprises fall into an 
intermediate category. ^ ^ 
Rural enterprises with different forms of ownership do not have equal 
status. Township enterprises are of lower status than state enterprises or 
urban collective enterprises. Village enterprises are lower in status than 
township enterprises and so on. The higher the grade of a firm, the more 
preferential treatments and resources it can get from the governments and 
hence, the stronger its sense of financial security. The lower the status of an 
enterprise, the more directly is the firm's income linked to that of its owners 
and the clearer are the relations between them. 32 
Due to the unequal treatment towards the different ownership of 
enterprises, transfers and changes in enterprise ownership always appear among 
them. 
Collective enterprises in difficulties can be sold or leased to private 
entrepreneurs. Then the labor working in the previous firms can still maintain 
their jobs. On the other side, owners of private enterprises can sell them or 
have them raised to the status of collective enterprises. They may enjoy various 
kinds of preferential treatments. However, the standard procedure for the 
transfer and change of ownership of rural enterprises is unclear. These changes 
are always carried out according to the unofficial agreements.^^ 
Actually ownership is an important factor in affecting the prospect of the 
development of an enterprise. Different ownerships of enterprises meet 
different treatments of local governments (It will be detailed in the following 
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chapters). Different treatments by government explicitly and implicitly 
formulate the distinctive development pattern of rural enterprises in the region. 
Now let us examine what the development pattern of rural enterprises in 
Zhongshan is. 
Development Pattern of Rural Enterprises 
Official data for the number of collective enterprises was available from 
1978 to 1990 whereas private enterprises from 1984 to 1990. Thus, the 
discussion will concentrate on the period between 1984 and 1990. There are 
five sets of indicators that illustrate the development pattern of rural enterprises. 
They include (1) number of enterprises, (2) number of employees, (3) gross 




























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































1. Number of enterprises Figure 1 
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Figure (1) shows that the number of collective enterprises was much 
fewer than collective enterprises in 1984-90. The growth rate of the number of 
collective sector was lower than that of the private sector. The number of 
collective enterprises remained more or less stable in 1978-90. Compared with 
1984, it increased by 32.32 percent in 1985. This was because some policies in 
1984 mentioned above encouraged the development of the collective sector. 
Compared to the collective enterprises, private enterprises grew much more 
faster. The average annual growth rate was over 80 percent in the private 
sector whereas collective enterprises grew less than 8 percent. The number of 
private enterprises, however, declined suddenly in 1989-90. This was because 
the state commanded local governments to cut down bank credit for enterprises. 
Private enterprises were the first to be affected and many of them had to be shut 
down. 
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2. Number of employees 
Figure 2-1 
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500 
400 - _ 
� _ l i _ 
1985 1986 1987 19S8 1989 1990 Year ^Col lec t ive ^ Private 
Figure 2-2 
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Source： From Zhongshan Rural Enterprise Management Bureau 
26 
The data in figure (2-1) demonstrated that the number of employees was 
much higher in the collective sector than the private sector. This was opposite to 
the previous situation that the number of collective enterprises was much fewer 
than the private sector. Thus, although there were comparatively fewer 
collective enterprises than private ones, the former had a much stronger labor 
absorption capability than the latter. 
Collective enterprises showed a continuous increase in employment. 
Private enterprises, however, declined slightly in 1989-90 because a number of 
them closed down in the rectification stage. On average, figure (2-2) showed 
that the number of workers in the private sector was about 2 to 3 persons and 30 
to 40 in collective sector. The collective sector absorbed ten times more 
workers than the private sector. 
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3. Gross output value and fixed asset value 
Figure 3-1 
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Gross output value (GOV) can show the performance while the fixed 
asset value (FAV) can demonstrate the capability of the collective enterprise. 
Figure (3-1) and figure (3-2) show that the collective sector grew at a faster rate 
increase than private enterprises in 1984-90 in terms of GOV and FAV. 
Indeed，collective enterprises grew remarkably since 1984. Their gross output 
value in 1990 was 25 times that of 1978. In 1990，collective enterprises shared 
85.6 percent and 89.6 percent of GOV and FAV respect ively in rural 
enterprises in 1990. Consequently, collective enterprises dominated the market 
throughout the period studied. 
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Regarding gross income, collective enterprises (figure 4-1 ) show a 
consistently high share of at least 81 percent of rural enterprises' gross income 
in 1984-90. The net profit of collective enterprises (figure 4-2)，however, 
indicated a comparatively lower share than it was in terms of gross income. 
The share of net profit of collective enterprises (figure 4-3) declined from 74.3 
percent in 1985 to 55.2 percent in 1990 while private sector showed a increase 
tendency from 25.7 percent to 55.2 percent in the same period. 
This interesting phenomenon can be explained by the high consumption 
expenses of the collective sector. Besides paying taxes, management costs paid 
by collective enterprises are remarkably high. They pay not only the expenses of 
the enterprises themselves, but also the expenses of their owners i.e. local 
governments. For example, various kinds of expenses consumed by local cadres 
such as travel, meetings, purchasing personal gifts and others. This inevitably 
reduces the net profit though their income is high. In addition, the severe tax 
evasion in private enterprises helps to retain more profit for themselves. Under 
such circumstances, the net profit of collective sector does not share a very high 
proportion when compared to the private sector. ^ ^ 
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5. Tax payment 
Figure 5-1 
Tax Payment In 1985 
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Tax Payment in 1989 
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Source: From Zhongshan Rural Enterprise Management Bureau 
The higher income the collective enterprises earn, the more taxes they 
pay. The average amount of taxes paid by coilective enterprises was about 83 
percent of the total tax payment of rural enterprises in 1985-90 (figure 5-1). As 
mentioned before, tax evasion in the private sector was more severe than in the 
collective sector. The private sector paid less than they should pay. 
As a whole, the figures presented earlier showed a common feature that 
both sectors accelerated their growth since 1984. This was because the state and 
regional policies encouraged the development of both ownerships in 1984. With 
the exception of the number of enterprises, collective enterprises showed a 
continuous predomination in employment, gross income, net profit, fixed asset 
value and tax payment over the private sector in 1984-90. 
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Collective enterprises played a more significant role than private 
enterprises in the market. The collective sector constituted only 16.2 percent of 
the total number of rural enterprises but contributed 85.6 percent of GVO，74 
percent of employment, 84.5 percent of gross income, 89.6 percent of fixed 
value and 81.4 percent of tax payment in the whole rural enterprises of 
Zhongshan in 1990 (figure 5-2). This clearly showed that collective enterprises 
played a crucial role in the rural economy and private sector just played an 
supplementary role at that time. 
In short, collective enterprises have economically dominated over the 
private sector in the market regarding the development pattern of rural 
enterprises in 1978-90. 
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Objectives of local governments 
Oi mentions that local governments play a determinant role shaping the 
development pattern of rural enterprises.^^ In fact, the objectives of local 
governments directly affect their behavior and in turn affect the development of 
rural enterprises. Basically, the objectives of local governments on collective 
enterprises can be the folio wings: first, to provide a wide range of public and 
social services to the place, in other words, to enhance local prosperity as a 
whole; second, to offer job opportunities to local people; third, to protect local 
cadres, economic and political interests and finally, to seek profit in the market. 
These objectives are closely interrelated to one another. 
Social welfare 
As representatives of communities, it is understandable that local gov-
ernments provide social welfare to localities as their chief duty. In rural areas, 
there is the so-called "five guarantees“ system which aims at catering the five 
necessities (food, clothing, fuel, education and burial) for orphans, old 
widowers, widows，disabled, and homeless peasants.^^ As a result, the fund-
ing was mainly collected from local communes and brigade enterprises before 
1984 but from township and village enterprises after that. Most of the expendi-
tures on community services are drawn from the profit of collective enterprises. 
Nonetheless, private sector is free from any obligation to provide social service 
to the community. Since local governments do not have asset on private 
enterprises, the former usually do not expect much revenues from the latter.^^ 
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Job opportunity provisinn 
Providing job opportunities to local residents is one of the goals of local 
governments. Data mentioned above showed that the labor absorption rate of 
collective enterprises is ten times as much as that of the private sector. 
According to "Governmental Employment Guidelines" in Zhongshan, local 
people are employed first.^^ Furthermore, employees in collective enterprises 
usually receive a reasonable salary and a good welfare package. Employees 
always have a better job security in collective sector. The turnover rate was 
lower than 15 percent in 1990/® ( See figure 1) 
Private enterprises, however, are not bound by the Guidelines and do not 
comply with the guidelines. Since 1984，they have autonomy in recruiting 
whoever they like, not necessarily local people. In fact, immigrants are always 
the targets for the private sector's recruitment owing to their low wages they are 
willing to accept. Exploitations of workers are prevalent in the private sector� 
Job mobility is also high. The turnover rate could be up to 45 percent in 
1990.41 Thus the private sector does not contribute as much as the collective 
enterprises in terms of providing job opportunities to local people. 
Ensure a continual stay in office 
Township leaders, township and village secretaries are still appointed by 
higher authority whereas village leaders are already nominated by local citizens. 
Their term is four y e a r s W h e t h e r local leaders are appointed or nominated, 
their present roles have changed when compared with the past. 
The lower the level of administrative hierarchy in China, the less 
detailed is the job division. Therefore, a local leader may play dual roles 
simultaneously. They are not only responsible for administrative affairs, but 
also act as directors of boards in collective enterprises. In other words, they are 
cadres and businessmen at the same t ime/ ; In the Mao era, the political role 
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overrode the other one. In the post-Mao era, however, the economic role has 
become more important. From the view point of local citizens, upgrading the 
living standard of the community is the most important t h i n g F r o m the view 
point of higher authorities, extracting income from profitable collective 
enterprises is what they care most.45 As mentioned above, the affluence of 
locality is always linked closely with the profitability of collective enterprises. 
In order to continue to stay in office, local leaders have to maintain a good 
performance of collective enterprises. This becomes a crucial criterion for both 
higher authority and local people to judge their success. 
Profit seeking 
Profit seeking is indispensable in supporting the above objectives. A 
profitable collective enterprise can maintain a sufficient provision for social 
welfare, a high employment rate and the cadres' continual stay in office. 
Profit seeking in collective enterprises is different from that in private 
enterprises. The single and only goal of the private sector is simply profit 
maximization. They just pursue high profit and quick investment return. 
Hence, their investment strategy is always short and unstable. Private 
entrepreneurs are mostly engaged in non-agricultural activities which yield 
immediate and tangible profits. No other objectives can contradict that of profit 
maximization. 
However, collective enterprises have to weigh and trade off the objective 
of seeking profit when it comes into conflict with social welfare or job 
opportunity provisions. It indeed often occurs. While providing social welfare, 
collective enterprises naturally reduce their capital for reinvestment so that it 
might hinder their development. These two objectives, seeking profit and social 
welfare provision, are always incompatible with each other. 
In addition, Wang Xiaolu believes that increasing employment will run 
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in conflict with profit making.^^ His concept is not essentially true. The 
objectives of increasing employment and gaining profit, however, are not 
necessarily contradictory to each other. Zhongshan collective enterprises can 
offer a counter example which allows us to reconsider Wang's argument. 
Deducting the non-work force (children, aged, disables, etc.) from the 
total population of 1.1 million in Zhongshan in 1990, there was a labor force of 
0.8 million.^^ This was not enough to fulfill the booming needs of the market. 
Moreover, a steadily increasing number of peasants is unwilling to be workers 
in the factories after getting a lump sum of compensation fees by land 
requisition. Many of them would like to set up their own business in sole 
proprietorship or partnership enterprises with friends. Some of them prefer to 
stay in home supported by land requisition fees. It does not mean that they do 
not have job opportunity but they do not take it. Zhongshan does not face the 
problem of surplus labor; instead, it faces a shortage of local labor force. If 
there is any surplus labor，they are usually the transient population but not the 
local people. 
Zhongshan collective enterprises need plenty of labor to expand the scale 
of existing enterprises and establish new enterprises. Expanding enterprises in 
turn can lead to greater return. After enlarging enterprises, they can also 
absorb more labor. Then the larger enterprises can have a higher output value 
and make a higher profit. This can form a "positively reinforcing cycle. “ Under 
such circumstance, these two objectives are actually complementary to each 
other in the context of Zhongshan. Here Wang's argument should be modified; 
increasing employment may run counter to profit making only if the enterprise 
over-absorbs labor. Whether the increase of employment comes into conflict 
with profit making is highly dependent on the enterprise's financial situation. It 
is problematic for Wang to conclude that increasing employment will lower the 
profit-making margin. He neglects to consider the prospects and financial 
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situation of the enterprise. In Zhongshan, many collective enterprises are still in 
the expansion stage and they need to increase the number of workers hired. 
Thus，increasing employment can in turn increase the profit-making margin in 
the case of Zhongshan. 
Priority to promote collective enterpHsps 
If local governments fail to achieve the goal of making profits from the 
collective enterprises, it is impossible to achieve other objectives - to provide 
social service, to absorb surplus labor and to consolidate local leaders' chances 
of staying in office. 
Nonetheless, private enterprises merely pursue the maximization of 
profit as their single and goal. They have no responsibility on public service, 
no obligation to providing job opportunity at the expense of sacrificing partial 
profit, no commitment to set long term investment planning/^ 
Consequently what the private sector can contribute to the community is 
comparatively less than the collective sector. Moreover, local governments 
have no share in the firms ‘ assets and do not expect a high return from them. 
Under such circumstances, local government officials do have a set of values 
imposing on the private enterprises. 
Zhongshan local governments give priority to promote collective 
enterprises rather than private ones due to some reasons. Zhongshan local 
cadres have expressed clearly their view point as follows: 
If the private sector grows faster than the collective sector in 
rural areas and economically dominates the market, it may not be 
an healthy phenomenon. The former does not have a sense of 
social responsibility as much as the latter to the society. (They 
imply that private enterprises do not contribute as much funding 
as collective enterprises to local governments )• We are unable to 
offer a better public service to the community. We believe that 
our people do not wish to see a drawback in their social security. 
We do wish a cont inuat ion of balanced development of 
enterprises and social welfare here as well ！ ^ ^ 
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Firstly, the local government leaders believed the expansion of one 
sector will inevitably cause the contraction of the other. Local cadres worry that 
collective enterprises' predominant position will be replaced by the private 
sector. The township and village governments - the main force in achieving 
local community goals - will not function effectively because it will face a 
shortage of fund. Revenue from private enterprises' taxation can never be 
enough to meet the overall development needs of the locality. In addition, the 
tax system in China has never been perfect, and tax evasion by private 
enterprises will further reduce government effectiveness and income.5i As a 
result，the other objectives besides profit making cannot be achieved. 
Local government's expenditures mainly rely on the income of rural 
industrial enterprises in recent years. Before 1984，the income sources of local 
government came from both agricultural and industrial production. As time 
passed, local government's income heavily depended on industrial and tertiary 
rural enterprises.^^ Among the rural enterprises, collective ones have played an 
important role to nurture local government. From the view point of local 
officials, it is rational for them to protect and promote collective enterprises first 
for the interests of the whole community, and certainly, for the interests of the 
local governments as well. This is the main reason for giving priority to 
promoting collective enterprises. 
In short, collective enterprises and local governments are interdependent 
on each other. As local governments act as strong representatives of 
communities, they expand their revenues through profit remittances from the 
firms. They seek to increase employment and raise local living standards by 
requiring collective enterprises to absorb more labor, by supporting unprofitable 
or money-losing firms, and by transferring part of enterprises' profits to local 
residents in terms of social welfare.^^ Collective enterprise's starting and later 
development depend on the local government's support. 
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The other reason is the ideological restraint still places a certain 
influence in the development of the rural economy. The ideas of local cadres 
toward ideology are quite diverse but can be classified into two groups. One 
group believes that China is still a socialist country in which central decision 
makers will sooner or later make a hard raid on the private sector. There must 
be a bottom-line on the extent of privatization. Having experienced the frequent 
policy pendulum shift，they prefer to promote collective enterprises which are 
still compatible to the ideology of collective ownership and egalitarianism and 
advantageous to the long-term stable development of the rural economy. The 
state hopes that the development of collective enterprises is an answer to the 
question of socialism in terms of rural economic reform.54 Private ownership 
can just act as a supplement to the collectively owned economy. In fact, 
collective enterprises have already shown a satisfactory performance. They 
thought that they should not take such a risk in promoting the private sector 
without getting a significant income.^^ 
Another group states that ideological constraint has been weakening. 
They believe that an expanding income inequality in China is an indicator to 
show that ideological constraint is no more important. They are not afraid of the 
central policy pendulum shift because they can interpret the central policy in 
such a way as it is favorable to them. Therefore, they support the development 
of collective enterprises not because they worry about the ideological constraint 
but mainly because the local governments' incomes largely rely on the collective 
sector. 
Consequently, local cadres' attitude is consistent in giving priority to 
promote collective enterprises although some of their motives may vary. 
In other words, Zhongshan governments consistently support the 
continual development of collective enterprises. The protection of collective 
enterprises, however, is motivated both by its administrative role and its status 
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as owner. However, the protection of private enterprises is motivated only by 
the role as the government administration. The support of local governments in 
Zhongshan towards private enterprises depends on certain circumstances. 
Externally, the township government adopts protective measures for private 
enterprises only when these firms come into conflict with entities outside the 
community or when their development is hindered by unfavorable policies from 
higher levels of government. Internally, local governments allow the existence 
of private enterprises with restrictions and promote them as long as they do not 
threaten the dominating position of collective ones. In the eyes of local cadres, 
the private sector is to be kept as a supplementary economy which is to fill the 
gaps left by the collective sector. ^ ^ As their scale expands to an extent which 
may threaten the collective enterprises, local governments will intervene and 
control the development of private enterprises by the "tilt" policies. Therefore, 
based on the above reasons, the primary concern and protection are usually 
given to collective enterprises. 
After understanding what the development pattern of the collective sector 
is, and the reasons why local governments give priority to support the collective 
sector, the following two chapters will discuss from a comparative perspective 
how local governments implement different policies to both sectors. 
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Chapter 3 
Policies of Local Governments 
on Rural Collective Enterprises 
This chapter discusses the implementation of state and regional policies 
by local governments on township and village enterprises. Various aspects of 
policy implementation include license issue, finance (credit loans and tax), 
resource allocation (raw materials and land), employees, and marketing. This 
chapter will investigate how Zhongshan local governments protect and promote 
the collective sector by different local preferential treatments. It will help us 
understand that an interdependent relationship exists between local governments 
and rural collective enterprises, mutually benefiting both sides. 
1 License 
Getting a license is the first and foremost step to enter the market. 
Without a license , a brilliant plan cannot be realized. The Industrial and 
Commercial Bureau (ICB) is responsible for the sanctioning of licenses for rural 
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enterpr ises . Collective enterprises under the jurisdict ion of the local 
government will not face difficulties in applying for a license because ICB is a 
subordinate body of the local government. As the owner of collective 
enterprises, local governments can surely exercise their power to help their 
enterprises obtain a license. In fact, very few applications from collective 
enterprises have been unsuccessful. ^  
The number of licenses issued to collective enterprises in 1990 reached 
4416. The number of collective enterprises had increased 32.3 percent as 
compared to 1985. This is due to the affirmation of the importance of industrial 
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development in rural areas in 1984. This gave confidence to local cadres to boost 
up rural enterprises. The total number of licenses issued to collective 
enterprises has been quite stable since 1979，even during the tight credit period 
1989-90.2 
Since the emergence of collective enterprises, the ICB has simplified the 
procedure and shortened the waiting period for getting the license. When the 
ICB knows that a collective enterprise is applying for the license, they usually 
will not raise any questions. Red tape problems do not frequently bother the 
collective sector. 
Besides the strong asset capability of the collective enterprises, its 
ability to get a license quickly and easily is one of the advantages for attracting 
overseas investors to cooperate with them. This is why the business of 
processing and assembling of business and joint ventures usually involve the 
collective sector rather than the private one.3 Registration in the collective 
sector makes it convenient for them to start their businesses. 
The issue of a license can be an effective tool to shape the development 
pattern of enterprises. To avoid direct competition between the collective and 
the private sector, ICB has restricted the issue of license from applicants who 
want to run individual and partnership enterprises. This is aimed at protecting 
the industrial market share of the collective sector/ ICB has strongly protected 
the domination of collective enterprises in the industrial sector. Actually the 
tendency of private enterprises in Zhongshan today is leaning toward tertiary 
production. In Sha Lang Township, there is a lack of big industrial collective 
enterprises. The strategy is to boost up the tertiary economy by the private 
enterprises 
Getting a license is certainly a first step to enter the market, but this 
does not ensure an prosperous development. Possessing sufficient financial 
support is also a very crucial factor for enterprises to expand themselves or deal 
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with financial difficulty. 
2 Finance 
Sufficient financial support inevitably plays an important role in the 
healthy operation of a firm. The financial perspective here includes founding 
capital，credit and loan, tax and levy. 
2.1 Founding Capital 
There are four financial sources of founding capital for collective 
enterprises. Firstly, it was from the accumulation of communes and brigades 
before 1984. Now, it is mainly accumulated from village and township 
governments. Local government grants were the most important source of 
capital for the founding of township enterprises and village enterprises. 
Secondly, large amounts of capital come from the sale of agricultural land to 
foreign investors. A third channel is the money borrowed from banks, mainly 
the Agricultural Bank of China and the local credit cooperatives. It is extremely 
rare that local banks reject collective enterprises' borrowing because the local 
government is a guarantor which possesses a larger proportion of assets than 
any other sectors in the community. The founding of collective enterprises was 
greatly supported by banks and credit unions. Thus the scale of collective 
enterprises can be very large and highly institutionalized at the founding stage. 
The issue of credit and loan will be detailed in the next section. Fourthly, 
founding capital can be accumulated from peasants' personal savings. The 
factory promises to yield a higher interest rate and a greater return to peasants 
than banking institutions .6 
2.2 Credit and Loan 
Bank loans are mainly come from the Agricultural Bank of China 
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(ABOC)’ The People's Bank of China (PBGC) and rural credit cooperatives. 
They always const i tute a vital role in every stage of rural enterprise 
development. Bank loans on both collective and private enterprises have grown 
larger and larger. Rural enterprises' dependence on bank loans varies greatly 
with ownership. The share of bank loans for collective enterprises in 
Zhongshan was consistently higher than private enterprises.7 
Influencing the credit decision by local government is one of the most 
crucial fac tors to a f fec t the future development of rural enterpr ises . 
Ownership, guarantor, and output value are important criteria for banks and 
credit unions to judge the loan application. A high production output is 
considered a good financial situation. The higher the output value of that 
enterprise, the greater the chances for securing a loan. A trustworthy guarantor 
such as the local government can give confidence to the banks for collecting the 
debt due to its very close relationship with banking institutions.^ Collective 
enterprises in Zhongshan usually possess the above conditions. 
Banks and credit unions fully support collective enterprises in every 
stage. As mentioned earlier, the founding stage of collective enterprises is 
supported by local banks and credit unions. The scale of the firms can be very 
large in the beginning stage. As China entered into the rapid development stage 
(1984-88)，collective enterprises found it easier to borrow from banks and credit 
unions. They grasped a good opportunity to expand their businesses by 
borrowing money from local banks. The data show that the gross output value 
was the highest in record, (see figure 3-1). 
In the rectification period (1989-90)，the state demanded to control the 
credit to rural enterprises. The imposition of tighter credit controls by the 
central government was in the interests of macroeconomic stability. Reductions 
in loans were designed to restrain the growth of the rural industrial sector to 
control an "overheated economy". Such an excessive fast growth can lead to 
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high inflation. The People's Bank of China, the Agricultural Bank, and other 
specialized banks were instructed not to extend loans or credits to enterprises 
which were inefficient or were turning out expensive products of poor quality 
with little or no profits or taxes paid to the state. But the first to be cut were 
usually the private enterprises rather than collective enterprises.^ 
Collective enterprises still obtained funds through indirect channels. 
Local o f f ic ia l s also promoted local industry by allowing rural credit 
cooperatives to make loans to the collective sector. Though there were limited 
funds，in periods of tight credit, it was enough to keep an enterprise in 
operation，Local governments intended to tackle the central policy and 
maintain the growth of rural enterprises by encouraging enterprises to look for 
money by themselves through processing businesses and three types of foreign 
funded enterprises, u The political atmosphere of the June-Fourth Incident in 
1989 diminished investors' desire on China. Fortunately, some collective 
enterprises managed to procure funds from local residents and factory 
employees through an effective share-holding system. 
Share-holding system 
The share-holding system can take place in two ways. One is to sell out 
part of the enterprise. During the late 1980s, it was merely a second choice 
because enterprise owners were afraid that the internal administration and 
decision making would be intervened by others. Moreover, many share buyers 
were overseas investors. The critical period during and after June-Fourth 
Incident made them hesitate to buy shares.^^ 
The second way to generate funds is to issue bonds to peasants in the 
local community. Collective and large private enterprises try to procure capital 
by offer ing a higher interest rate to the peasants and employees.^^ The 
peasants are encouraged by local authorities and enterprise leaders to deposit 
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their savings in those enterprises in which they themselves work in. Enterprise 
leaders believe that this will enable workers to have a sense of belonging and 
responsibility, to increase the motivation of productivity, to maintain the 
continuation of the expansion, and to develop the enterprise.i4 Finally, this 
will benefit the local economic development. 
Local cadres believe that it is a way to absorb peasants and workers' 
idle money to invest on a bigger project. More and more peasants gradually 
participate in this planning”. The peasants have expressed that owing to a lack 
of knowledge, it is difficult for them to decide where to invest their idle money. 
Even those who do not join the share-holding planning believe that it is an 
acceptable idea to make more money. The share-holders in the several 
township enterprises in the Sha Xi township have stated that they have got the 
bonus already and are quite satisfied with the policy. They can receive their 
portion of profits in the form of annual dividends on their shares. 
Consequently, despite the tight controls on loans imposed by the bank in 
1990, collective enterprises still maintained their operational size without 
shrinking. 17 The self-financing strategy was of great value. Besides this, local 
banks would aid collective enterprises which face financial difficulties. 
Facing financial difficulty 
Regarding the relationship between bank officials and local cadres, on 
the one side, bank officials have to follow the commands of state, on the other 
side, they need to serve the interest of local economic development. However, 
in the tight credit period, the two roles are sometimes contradictory to one 
other. Under circumstances of role conflict, local banks usually obey the 
central command whenever possible. For example, although the interest rate 
of Agricultural Bank and People's Bank of China is fixed by the central 
government, banks operate at the extreme of the central government's 
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limitations. 18 When collective enterprises face financial difficulties, local 
governments may negotiate with banks to take the following actions: 
1. Delayed repayment - the most usual way is to allow firms to delay 
repayments of principal and interest but a higher interest rate is charged. 
Delayed repayment has contributed to the low rate of shutdown of collective 
enterprises although relevant bureaus refused to release the data about the 
number of collective enterprises which are facilitated with delayed repayment. 
From the view point of banks, there is an incentive to prevent a collective 
enterprise from failing because there is no hope of recouping loans if it was 
completely shut down.^^ 
2. Sometimes they even provide additional credit in the hope that the 
enterprise will be able to turn the situation around but, of course, with a higher 
interest rate.:� 
3. Sometimes tax officials, either on their own or at the urge of local 
leaders, will try to persuade bank officials to release a loan, by allowing to offer 
loan repayments before taxes are assessed so that more funding can be retained 
in the enterprise.^^ 
4. Local governments may ask another collective enterprise to pay back 
the debt of the problematic enterprise to the bank first. Then the local 
government would change the managerial personnel of the problematic factory 
and then transfer some production items from a healthy enterprise to the 
problem enterprise. Hopefully, the problematic enterprises can turn their 
situation around.^^ 
5. As the very last choice, local governments will sell or lease the 
money-losing collective enterprise to private enterprises or merge them with 
private enterprises due to mutual benefits. From the view point of collective 
enterprises, workers could continue their jobs. Then collective enterprises are 
still able to fulfill their commitment to provide job opportunity. From the view 
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point of private enterprises, they could upgrade status with collective enterprises 
and thus enjoy preferential treatment.^^ Nonetheless this is the final way for 
local governments to deal with financial difficulty. 
After discussing how local banks fully support collective enterprises, we 
should also understand why local banks do so. 
Firstly, the goal of local banks is in line with that of collective 
enterprises. Both of them have the objective to foster local welfare.^^ Local 
banks give priority to assisting collective enterprises which fulfill a social 
responsibility. This is very different from private enterprises as profit seeking is 
their mere goal. 
Secondly, local banks cannot lend money outside the township. Their 
funds are considered community capital and should be utilized only for the local 
interests. Collective enterprises set up their businesses with local community 
capital and invest locally for the interest of the local community. On the 
contrary, it is common for private entrepreneurs to invest the lending money 
wherever they find profitable, probably outside the township. This is 
incompatible with the principle of local banks.^^ 
Thirdly, collective enterprises are consistently the largest borrowers 
from the local banks and so constitute a stable income source by returning 
interest and principle to the banks.^^ 
Fourthly, in the rural areas, the township government has always 
explicitly or implicitly served as a guarantor for bank borrowings by township 
enterprises under its jurisdiction, and the village government does the same for 
village firms. There are usually more than one enterprise under the jurisdiction 
of the local government. If a collective enterprise shuts down, outstanding debts 
would shift to its owner - the local government which would then allocate the 
funds of other enterprises to repay the loan. This is known as a "risk sharing" 
policy. From the view point of bank officials, the policy enforced their 
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conf idence to grant a loan. This risk sharing was usually ad hoc and 
informal.27 Both the local cadre and the enterprise manager expressed that 
Zhongshan collective enterprises were financially wealthy and seldom needed to 
implement this policy. ^ ^ 
2.3 Taxation 
While credit and loan is a way to absorb funds for the development of 
enterpr ises , tax and levy is surely a mean to take away their funds. 
Enterprises attempt their best to obtain credit and loan, while simultaneously 
attempting to avoid paying taxes. Although both collective and private sectors 
have the same desire to evade tax, the former has been preferentially treated by 
the local government to attain the goals. Collective enterprises not only have 
found it easier to access credit and loan, but they have also been treated with a 
favorable tax policy. 
Taxation has been an important mechanism for the state to attempt to 
control economic activity. Taxes are the primary source of revenues. They are 
also an important tool in restricting private ownership in favor of the state and 
collective enterprises. In Zhongshan, the collective sector has been granted a 
relatively attractive treatment on taxation. Tax reduction varies from 10 percent 
to 50 percent. If a company faces financial difficulties, a tax break may be 
granted accord ing ly by the state with the recommendat ion of local 
governments.29 Collective enterprises can enjoy income tax reduction or 
exemption under the following circumstances: 
1. A newly established collective enterprise which is in financial 
difficulty can enjoy one year income tax exemption. Almost all of the collective 
enterprises are usually recommended by local governments to apply for tax 
exemption by using this regulation. 
2. Newly established collective enterprises in producing feed industry 
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may qualify for a three-year income tax exemption. 
3. Those collective enterprises directly producing agricultural products 
such as agricultural fert i l izers, insecticides, pesticides and other farming 
equipments may qualify for income tax breaks or reduction. 
4. Those col lect ive enterpr ises using residual materials as chief 
production materials may qualify for a five-year income tax exemption. 
5. Collective enterprises operating in poor regions suffering from 
economic drawbacks may qualify for certain degree of exemption or reduction. 
6. Those collective enterprises hampered by natural disaster may 
qualify for a one-time tax reduction or exemption, 
7. Those collective enterprises with 60 percent of total employees made 
up of youth waiting for jobs could enjoy a two-to-three-year income tax 
exemption. The unemployment rate is kept low by this incentive. 
8. Those collective enterprises working in the high technology industry 
could enjoy the same preferential treatment as state-owned enterprises.叨 
Zhongshan local governments have encouraged enterprises to set up 
production lines in the high technology areas that are exploitative nature. The 
establishment of the "Zhongshan Huoju High Technology and Development 
Region"( 中山炬高技術發展區 ) i n 1992 aims to promote high 
technological and scientific products. Many collective enterprises engaged in 
this field have already been granted at least a two-year income tax exemption 
and further tax reductions and tax breaks have been requested. Moreover, the 
calculation of each kind of tax is based on the measurement unit in 1990 and 
does not change for years.^^ 
Furthermore, since the joint-venture could enjoy most tax preferential 
treatments, collective enterprises would like to cooperate with them and be 
registered in that same category. 
Local governments help collective enterprises to acquire funds through 
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tax reductions and breaks to the limit of the state's ability. However, the 
private sector is not eligible for these benefits. This is the lure for private 
enterprises to try to register as collective enterprises to acquire the benefits. 3 2 
State Tax 
State tax from collective enterprises has been growing significantly in the 
state revenues over the past years in China. In 1975, 13.4 percent of state 
revenues were drawn from collective enterprises. This has grown to 38.5 
percent in 1 9 8 7 , Total tax payments by collective enterprises in Zhongshan 
has also rapidly increased from 7.09 million yuan in 1978 to 67.34 million yuan 
in 1990.34 Although taxation has been a major resource extraction historically, 
the state has gradually lost its control on problems of state tax evasion in 
several localities. On the other hand, local governments have adopted a non-
cooperative attitude towards state tax submission. In Zhongshan it is quite 
common for local governments to assist in cheating the state so that the 
enterprises can retain more for their own improvement and in turn benefit the 
local economic development. Some ways to evade state tax are as follows: 
1. After enjoying the one-year tax exemption period, many collective 
enterprises close down their firm and then register again with new names so that 
they can enjoy another one year tax holiday. Some of them simply change the 
signboards before the arrival of the tax collector. Usually the local governments 
keep a blind eye on such state tax evasion especially when collective enterprises 
are in a difficult period. ^ ^ 
2. The accounting system in collective enterprises is much less formal 
than in state enterprises because bookkeeping is only used by the owners - local 
government. Leaders of township governments will not severely punish their 
firms for cheating and giving false accounts to state government agencies such 
as the tax, industrial and commercial, and statistical bureaus; in deed, they often 
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support such actions since the local leaders are concerned with the local 
economic development rather than the central revenues. 3 6 
3. Due to the weak accounting system, the officially reported tax figures 
may be underreported deliberately if the local authorities hope to retain a larger 
portion of the collected taxes and levies. The local authorities have full 
information on the account of enterprises but the data about local enterprises is 
not available to the state.^^ 
4. Besides tax evasion, the local government can legally encourage 
collective enterprises to reinvest their profit on enlarging the scale of the 
existing firms or setting up new enterprises. If too much profit remains within 
the enterprises themselves, the state have excuses to increase the tax rate on 
them. Actually, the tax rate has been going higher recently. This in turn has 
given incentives for state tax avoidance in the locality.38 Therefore the factory 
manager may try to use up, although perhaps not totally, a great amount of the 
profit on investment in a new supplementary line of production. 
Because of China's imperfect tax regulations combined with a lack of 
determination to fight against tax evasion, many local bureaus including the 
bank, township industrial cooperation, and tax bureau are being influenced by 
local governments. Later the related bureaus' officials become involved in the 
tax cheating behavior. ^ ^ For collective enterprises under the protection of local 
governmental bureaus, it is extremely difficult for the state to assess the taxes 
and detect the strategies used by taxpayers to evade taxation and to influence tax 
policy. 
3 Resource Allocation 
The resource allocation discussed here are the supply of raw material 
and the control over land use. 
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3.1 Raw material 
In the recovery stage, local governments controlled ample resources for 
collective enterprises through supply bureaus. The privileged access to larger 
amounts of state-priced inputs included chemical fertilizer and animal feed. 
Township and village enterprises could obtain needed materials at preferential 
prices through local governments. The price of inputs was always kept below 
market value, occasionally even below the state plan，Moreover, the quality 
of raw materials obtained by collective enterprises was ensured to be good. 
Collective enterprises only needed to pay a low or medium price. Occasionally 
a symbolic cost was charged when a particular enterprise was in financial 
difficulty/! 
Local governments usually built up a reservoir of raw materials for 
enterprises. When raw materials were in short supply, the local government 
demanded the Supply Bureau to give priority in distributing raw materials to the 
collective enterprises. Even if the needed materials were out of stock, local 
governments could adopt an "exchange policy" through its wide network/^ 
This policy meant that local governments acquired the necessary materials from 
other localities and in return offered them the materials they needed. This 
barter trade in terms of raw materials had mutual benefits for each other. This 
horizontal linkage led to an increase in efficiency when the other side had idle 
resources. This exchange policy was very useful and it solved many similar 
problems. 
When private enterprises applies for a license, the ICB does not allow 
private enterprises to compete with collective enterprises for raw material .43 
As a whole, collective enterprises do not have to worry about the supply of 
materials because local governments secure most of resources for them. 
Entering into the rapid development stage, competition for raw materials 
became serious. As the "commodity economy" was suggested in 1984， 
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collective enterprises gradually needed to rely on themselves to look for raw 
materials. Besides a better access to good and cheap raw materials, the control 
over land use is another kind of resource in determining the competitiveness in 
the market. 
3.2 Land 
After adopting the Production Responsibility System in 1978，plots of 
land were gradually contracted to individual households. But, of course, they 
were remained collectively owned. Peasants found out that the profit return was 
higher in industry than in agriculture. This gave incentives to them to shift the 
arable land to industrial use. Today plenty of farmland has become the factory 
and building land. Although China is a nation with one-fourth of the world's 
population, they only have one-eleventh of the world's farmland.44 Moreover, 
only 10.3 percent of China's surface is a r a b l e . A s the farmland continues to 
decline, it draws many scholars' attention on how to balance the development of 
agriculture and industry especially in an advanced region such as Zhongshan. 
Zhongshan, which means "the land of fish and rice"，had fertile land and 
rich agricultural products and was once one of the most important growing areas 
for rice and sugar cane in Guangdong Province/^ But now the production of 
the above products is declining because less farm land is available. The title of 
"land of fish and rice" is no longer suitable for Zhongshan. In 1988，60-75 
percent of the arable land has already been taken by rural enterprises/^ Indus-
trial development, based on exploitation, is at the expense of agricultural land. 
The strong agricultural base has helped the early stage of development of rural 
enterprises, particularly those factories running the line of food products. One 
example is the abundant sugar produced and supplied as raw materials for the 
food-processing businesses. Today, food production has been greatly reduced, 
but industrial manufacturing has grown rapidly. 
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The department in charge of sanctioning land resides under the 
jurisdiction of the Land Bureau. Rural enterprises use the land to build 
fac tor ies . The Zhongshan City Land Bureau has only taken a macro 
management perspective toward land use. Each Township Land Bureau uses its 
own discretion to issue land to applicants. As the Land Bureau is one of the 
subordinate departments of the local government, less administrative constraints 
are imposed on collective enterprises. Less time is required to receive the land 
compared to the time required for private sector. Collective enterprises can also 
choose land closer to the market center. They also receive a longer term and 
lower rate for leasing the land. The land usually is close to transportation and 
accessible to infrastructure utilities such as electricity and water supply. The 
price of the land occupied by many collective enterprises has been rising 
rapidly. If they bought land within their own township or village, then they can 
enjoy the aforementioned benefits. If they buy land outside, however, their 
townships then they cannot enjoy those benefits.48 
Since 1990, Guangdong provincial land bureau has issued the "land use 
certificate" to prove the validity of the land lease because the Guangdong 
provincial planning department needed to measure the proportion of land use 
between agriculture and industry/^ Many counties and cities in the Pearl River 
Delta, however, do not report to the provincial land bureau including 
Zhongshan City. In fact, many collective enterprises' land has not been 
officially given a permit by the provincial land bureau. But under the protective 
umbrella of local governments, no fire or punishment will be imposed. Local 
governments do not only show concern for the inputs (raw materials and land) 
of collective enterprises, but also foster their market with great effort.^^ 
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4 Employefi 
The fourth perspective discussed is the human resource. In Zhongshan, 
the local people can mainly be classified, according to their jobs, into five 
categories. They 1) serve in agricultural work as mere obligation, 2) serve in 
rural enterprises as mere obligation, 3) serve in agricultural work as full time 
job and in rural enterprises as part time job, 4) serve in rural enterprises as full 
time job and in agricultural work as part time job, 5) are unemployed.^^ 
Regarding the proportion among the five mentioned above, the second 
and fourth kinds of rural people are increasing rapidly. On the other hand, the 
number of first and third kinds of people keeps on declining. The fifth category 
is slightly increasing.^^ Although there is no exact percentage in hand, the total 
amount of the second and fourth categories is about four-fifths of the total rural 
labor force.53 Enterprise workers still maintain the right to own and control the 
land，although the government may exercise its compulsory power to requisition 
the land with the reason to develop the local economy. Many people are still 
engaged in part-time nature in agricultural production. A famous slogan in the 
rural area, "leaving the land but not the village, entering the firms but not the 
city". Regarding the proportion of distribution in a variety of production today, 
over 60 percent of labor in Zhongshan are working in the secondary and 
tertiary productions.^"^ And, a growing number of peasants has left their agricul-
tural work. 
In Zhongshan, it is quite effective for rural collective enterprises to cope 
with the surplus labor and raise the local living standard. Basically, there is no 
unemployment in Zhongshan.^^ After Zhongshan has achieved full 
employment, it had a shortage of local labor on rural industrialization so that a 
lot of transient population from interior areas of China came and filled in the 
gap.56 This attracted many migrants to come and seek jobs. Hiring workers 
from other places has become a dominant policy when the local labor fell short 
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of supply. 
According to the regulations at that time by the Labor Bureau in 
Zhongshan, local residents were secured for job opportunity. For a local village 
enterprise, the recruitment priority is given to residents living in the village 
first，and then to other villages in the townships, and next, to other townships in 
the city, and finally to outsiders beyond Zhongshan C i t y . T h o u g h this 
regulation may seem too restrictive, collective enterprises do absorb a great deal 
of surplus labor, especially skilled labor. Theoretically speaking, outsiders 
should be the last ones to be hired. In reality, however, many outsiders having 
a personal relationship with managerial personnel in the enterprise are recruited 
first. 
Labor's first choice 
From the view point of local labor, they have free mobility in shifting 
their jobs within the city. After the legitimation of the private sector in 1984, 
some private firms challenged the supremacy of collective ones. They began to 
compete in hiring technical and marketing personnel and skilled workers. At 
one time, the impact was so tremendous that many skilled and competent 
personnel left collective enterprises and set up their own firms. These firms， 
nominally leased to private individuals, could enjoy tax exemption and other 
preferential treatment without contributing any savings to the collective, and 
they were free to compete with collectives for markets, personnel, and raw 
materials .58 This made collective enterprises set up a strategy to tackle this 
problem. 
In order to stabilize employment levels，Zhongshan authorities took 
steps to consolidate the position of the collectives. The principal measures 
included 1) to penalize the skilled labors; if a laborer left the collective 
enterprise, he or she was permanently excluded from jobs in the collective 
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sector in that village or township; 2) to increase income of the worker; to set 
workers’ wage under the piece-rate system and launch a bonus plan linked with 
output value; 3) to prolong and rewrite the regulation of contract of technical 
and marketing personnel; if they leave within the contract period, they need to 
compensate a large lump sum of money that they usually cannot afford; 4) to 
create a barrier for the leaver to obtain a license but this is not a usual way. 59 
After the implementation of these measures, the degree of shifting of 
technical personnel and skilled workers has decreased. In general, technical and 
marketing personnel prefer working in collective enterprises as their first 
choice，especially for the managerial personnel because of the remarkable 
retirement funds. Collective enterprises can provide job security, access to 
housing, pensions on retirement, and other welfare benefits. As the subordinate 
collective enterprises of local government, workers inside the enterprises are 
secured with full package of benefits such as life, accident and medical 
insurance, and pension.^^ 
From the early 1980’s，income generated by commune enterprises 
continually increased in proportion to total income, and there is reason to 
believe that commune enterprises attracted better-quality workers as well. These 
developments further consolidated the political base of communes. 
In 1988, the total gross output value of industrial collective enterprises 
grew sharply, about a 52 percent increase over the previous year/ i this rapid 
rise in profits was accompanied by a sharp increase in average wages and some 
expansion of employment. The average annual wage for workers in township 
enterprises rose about 30 percent. ^ ^ The success of collective enterprises is not 
only due to the labor system but also to an effective control and strong incentive 
structure for managerial personnel. 
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Manager personnp.1 
Regarding collective enterprise managers' income, there is a set of 
calculated method. Strong incentives for local leaders to promote rural 
enterprise development is a very important factor to the success of the sector. 
Income of local official leaders comes from two main sources - formal 
income and informal income. The income of the manager depends on the 
profitability of the enterprise. The formal income calculation is based on the 
income relationship between managers and employees. Since the nominal pay 
and supplements can not be greater than two times the workers' income. In 
order to raise his own salary, a manager has to raise the overall workers' wages 
to a certain level. Such linkage provides a very effective incentive system to 
promote the efficiency. Zhongshan collective enterprise managers can earn in 
excess of two times the average income of workers ." The allowable pay 
differential has grown wider, and the margin of the pay for the manager has 
increased. Therefore, it is desirable for collective enterprise leaders to 
constitute an explicit bonus system linked to township employment, output and 
profitability as indicators. In other words, the better the performance of the 
enterprise, the greater the income of the manager. 
Besides the performance of managerial personnel, incentives from local 
governmental leaders do play an inevitable role on account of the domination of 
collective enterprises. 
Incentives to government officials 
From the perspective of local governmental leaders, their personal 
rewards and career prospects depend largely on income, employment ,and 
revenue mobilization in their communities. Their personal benefits are 
associated with rural enterprise development and local economic progress. 
In the early stage, communes would financially help the lower level 
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enterprises such as brigades and production team enterprises. The lower level 
enterprises would turn to their superior governmental level for financial 
assistance. This formed an economic clan. After practicing a financial self-
reliant financial system, however, townships and villages have to rely on their 
own accounts for expenditure and income. Higher levels usually do not grant 
money to lower levels except in some special circumstances. Lower levels 
merely submit certain quota tax and levy to above. They can retain the 
excess.64 Under these circumstances, local official leaders concentrate their 
energy and local resources on promoting collective enterprises. The greater the 
boom of the collective enterprises's business, the higher income they have. On 
the contrary, the greater the shrinking of the collective sector, the less revenue 
they obtain. 
There is another interesting phenomenon in rural income for township 
leaders. If the state salary scale would strictly stick to what has been written 
down, the township leader may earn less than that of ordinary workers because 
the latter earn by work-point system. The more they do, the more they earn. 
However, township leaders' formal salary is fixed to a certain level. Therefore, 
the informal income is much more important for them. If the informal income 
is not that much, the income of workers in rich areas may earn more than 
leaders in not so rich regions. Some workers in well performing firms received 
higher salary than managers in poorly performing firms.^^ 
5 Marketing 
As mentioned at the very beginning, collective enterprises in Zhongshan 
have heavily dominated the rural market since 1978. In other words, collective 
enterprises have been far more numerous in terms of output value and number 
of people engaging in the enterprises than the private sector. Collective 
enterprises account for more than 80 percent of the total output in the market 
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over the past 13 years. In 1990, the total output value of collective enterprises 
in Zhongshan was about 50 billion yuan. The township industrial enterprises 
was 31.24 billion, the village industrial enterprises was 11.56 billion, 
partnership enterprises and sole proprietorship were merely 1.17 billion and 6 
billion respectively. 66 
The market share of both kinds of enterprises is growing. On the 
contrary, the market share of state-owned enterprises is at a steady 10 percent 
increment over the past ten years. But for the last two years, this number is 
remarkably higher. The collective enterprises are mainly exercising technical 
and capital intensive light industries and the private ones are shifting from labor 
intensive industries into technical and capital intensive tertiary industries.^^ 
Market environment change 
Before the emergence of a concrete private sector, the product sales of 
collective enterprises highly depended on government planning. Township 
enterprises would have a monopoly over the local market for its output. At the 
time, local authority had complete monopoly of imports and exports within 
their sphere of product specialization. Local governments would not import 
items that were being produced locally even if the Chinese products cost more 
and were of lower quality. Collective firms did not have to worry about losing 
their markets to superior foreign products and private enterprises^^. There was 
very little direct competition which could threaten the market of commune and 
brigade enterprises at that time. 
Under the central planned economy, prices were fixed by the central 
state. Enterprises had no discretionary power to set price by responding to the 
market change until 1984. The Twelve People Congress suggested a price 
reform of the "Commodity Economy". Price was determined by demand and 
supply in the market. The declaration of a "Commodity Economy" gave high 
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autonomy to enterprises to set prices on most of the commodities to a certain 
extent. 69 The elimination of state monopolies in purchasing and marketing in 
rural areas has created space for private enterprise development. 
Today collective enterprises' product sales could no longer depend on 
the full planning system. Instead, they depend partly on planning and 
increasingly on the market. Collective enterprises needed to adapt to the 
market change by upgrading the design and quality of products due to 
competitors' pressure. 
Furthermore, the emergence of the private sector did give more choices 
to rural consumers who have already a higher income caused by Production 
Responsibility System. Collective enterprises suddenly found themselves in a 
battle for customers with individual and partnership enterprises, as well as joint 
ventures. In addition, some foreign products are imported from overseas. The 
marketability of foreign products should not be neglected. Actually, Zhongshan 
citizens are fairly keen on purchasing products made overseas rather than in 
China. They prefer to pay a higher price to buy foreign brand products. 
Collective enterprises lost their monopoly over the control of markets. In order 
to keep up with the competition, collective enterprises had to prolong operating 
hours to increase production, become more customer-oriented 7o and strengthen 
its marketing strategy. 
Various types of markets 
Generally speaking, the market can be broken down into three types. An 
enterprise's output can be sold to the domestic market, the interior market, and 
the overseas market. 
Overseas market: Under the open and reform atmosphere, collective 
enterprises have attempted to enter the overseas market. In 1979 permission 
was granted to hold free rural m a r k e t s . T h e Zhongshan government decided 
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to adopt the export-oriented strategy to boost the rural economy by three major 
policies : 1. convert ing the local trading polices into open policy, 2. 
emphasizing scientific management, 3. utilizing advanced facilities and 
technology. Based on geographical proximity, linguistic and cultural similarities 
and overseas connection, local authorities began to develop the processing 
businesses with supplied materials, samples, designs, and one compensation 
trade. The above policies aim to explore the overseas market for the 
development of rural collective enterprises. In 1990，about 30 percent of 
collective enterprises' products was exported. However, it was not as profitable 
as interior and domestic market. ^ ^ 
Interior and domestic market: In 1990，about 40 percent and 30 percent 
of the collective enterprises' output was sold in the interior and the domestic 
markets respectively. Collective enterprises used to monopolize the domestic 
rural market. As markets by more private enterprises and joint ventures 
competed in the market, the demand from local market seems to have become 
saturated easily. In addition, as the neighboring cities in southern China have 
developed, they have also imposed competitive pressure on the local market. 
Thus, the interior market of Mainland China should be open up. A large 
portion, about 40 percent, of the products are sold to interior areas. Most 
products are sent to Jiangxi, Hunan, Sichuan and other interior r e g i o n s ” 
China is a hugely populated country, and the supply is still far from saturated in 
the interior market. Based on a wide and close relationship with leaders of 
other cities and provinces, it was easy to gain access to sales links. In fact, the 
interior market was the place where enterprises could gain the largest profit. 
The collective enterprises in Zhongshan was an inward-oriented 
market. As the environment of domestic market changed, local governments 
and collective enterprises practiced a series of measures to protect the market 
share as the folio wings: 
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Marketing strategy 
1. Increasing the sales force - Adapting to the change of a market 
environment, collective firms have taken an active role in introducing their 
products to customers by means of the salesperson, instead of passively waiting 
for customers to come to them. Since the beginning of 1990s，enterprises have 
paid more attention to the importance of the salesperson by hiring more. One 
township enterprise manager expressed that the sales force makes up two-fifth of 
the employees in the firms. The incomes of sales personnel were still rising. 
Sometimes, when they wanted to promote a kind of product, temporary 
salesperson were hired. 
The fieldwork showed that a proportionally higher amount of funding 
was granted to the sales department in many of the enterprises.74 By looking at 
the growth of funding in the sales department, we can see that it gradually 
become one of the very important units in the eyes of enterprises beginning 
1990,s. 
Enterprises leaders expressed that the hiring process for the salesperson 
team is highly select ive. Applicants usually have a higher academic 
qualification compared to the rest of the staff. The manager added that the 
policy of the firm was to place the most capable persons into sales department 
which receive ample funds from the enterprises.^^ Enterprises attempt to build 
up a good image on the job. Besides, the benefits from this job was attractive. 
2. Attractive benefits - In general, the sales force's salary is slightly 
higher than other jobs. The cost for traveling and lodging is covered by the 
enterprises. Some collective enterprises offer fringe benefits like housing and 
remarkable bonuses at the end of the year to salespersons in the managerial 
level. Certainly they could enjoy a high compensation value of life and accident 
insurance while other staff may not have. The most attractive benefits is the 
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possibility to gain incredibly high commissions. This policy has been learned 
from some large private enterprises which are successful at motivating their 
salespersons. A battle erupt over the recruitment of salespersons. Firms 
compete with each other by offering higher bonuses and commissions. On 
average, salespersons can earn 10,000 to 20，000 yuan per year.76 The sale 
superior and sale manager received a very high income of about 50000 yuan. 
Particularly at the end of the year, the bonus is really a big lump sum which can 
be ten times greater than the annual salary. Some top sales performers have 
even earned 100,000 yuan including bonuses and commissions.^^ Of course, the 
income was not consistent and stable. 
3. Product specialization - Collective enterprises focus on the 
development of a serial product or a closely related set of products. As new 
product lines are introduced, they are located in several factories. Each factory 
will dedicate to a specific line of products. Thus, it can be classified as a 
specialization- oriented mode. 
Due to the strong capital accumulation in collective enterprises, it is 
possible to specialize on a product line to enlarge the economies of scale. 
Managers believe that specialization can reap certain economic benefits. When 
a product has demonstrated its marketability and profitability, large amounts of 
funds may pool into full-scale production. These sources can come from 
enterprises themselves, local governments, local banks, or all of the above. 
Most collective enterprises appear to follow the specialization-oriented m o d e .78 
By the end of the 1980s, the major product lines of collective enterprises 
included textiles, plastics and rubber, electronics, metals, steel, paper making, 
garments and leather, shoemaking, daily necessities, chemicals, mechanical 
products, building materials, food and so on.79 
However, some disadvantages has been induced by the specialization-
oriented mode. The products from collective enterprises are usually lack 
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variety. Moreover，if the product line changes, the enterprise will incur a great 
expense due to the huge capital investment on a specialized product line. 
4. Establishing more trading markets - It is mutually beneficial to build 
trading markets which is a center for displaying commodities to cons画ers. 
People find that it is convenient to learn about the products and enterprises are 
able to promote and introduce products to consumers simultaneously. There 
were 101 trading markets increased with good facilities and environment in 
1990. Some of them are large in scale. They have spread from city center to 
townships . Township governments allocate the best locations to their 
enterprises. Collective enterprises fully utilize these trading markets. Local 
citizens find out most of products belong to collective sector， 
5. Based on the local governments' wide network, they could guarantee 
to sell a portion of the output to the local market and a portion to the interior 
market. The range can be from 20 percent to 50 percent. To a certain extent, 
local governments still can exercise manipulation through rough planning. ^^  
6. Moreover, those enterprises under the jurisdiction of the same 
township or village government usually did not set up enterprises to produce the 
same products and competed directly with each other. Local governments often 
tried to design a monopoly on that particular product line within the 
c o m m u n i t y . 82 However, the emergence of private enterprises and joint-
ventures had broken its monopoly. 
Table 2 
Number of Good Quality Products of Zhongshan Collective Enterprises 
Year 78| 79| 80丨 811 82| 83| 84丨 85丨 86| 87| 88丨 
R^ inc ia l T T 2 ~ ~ 2 ~ 8 " T s T s " ^ " T z 
Ministerial — 2 ~ 5 ~ 3 " " 2 ~ 5 ~ 6 ~ 9 
Totai I 1| 1| 4| 11| 5| 81 20| 211 30| 36 
Source: From Zhongshan Rural Enterprises Management Bureau 
76 
The author believes that it is a healthy phenomenon when private 
enterprises participate in competition since they create pressure on collective 
enterprises to perform well. This environment undoubtedly contributes to the 
efficiency, dynamism and flexibility of collective sector. In fact, collective 
enterprises have managed to dominate the market share. In 1990, 27 and 9 
products manufactured in Zhongshan rural enterprises were awarded the honors 
of Quality Product in provincial and ministerial competitions respectively^^ (See 
Table 2). The leaders of some of these rural enterprises demonstrated that 
promoting and innovating their products by scientific and technological methods 
was a major task undertaken. They added that the final aim was to enter into 
the overseas market and even the international one. 84 
6 Summary 
This chapter evaluates local governments ' policy on collective 
enterprises from five aspects: license, finance, resource allocation, employees 
and marketing. In short, the findings are as follows: 
1. Getting a license is the first step to enter the market. The license is 
issued through the Industrial and Commerce Bureau (ICB), a subordinate 
department of the local governments. Under the influence of the local 
governments, a simpler procedure and shorter time is needed to obtain the 
license without much difficulties. The domination of the collective sector in the 
industrial sector is protected by the ICB that controls the number of licenses 
issued to the private sector. 
2. From the financial perspective, local government grants and banking 
institution loans provide a strong founding capital to collective enterprises in the 
beginning stage. Local governments provide collective enterprises with an 
intangible resource - the use of the governments ‘ credibility. This trustworthy 
guarantor gives confidence to banks and rural credit unions to support collective 
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enterprises in every stage. 
Moreover，preferential policies such as tax exemption, tax reduction and 
tax break are imposed on collective enterprises. For the self-interest of locality, 
local governments cooperate with collective enterprises to evade the state tax so 
as retain more funds for local economic development. 
3. Raw materials supply and land use are under the control of the Supply 
Bureau and the Land Bureau respectively. Through indirect control by local 
government, collective enterprises can have access to cheaper and good quality 
inputs. Enterprises are allocated land close to the market center and with better 
access to the infrastructures. A longer term and lower rate for land leasing is 
also granted. 
4. Regarding the output market, collective enterprises have made big 
profits from domestic and interior markets. In response to the reform and open 
policy, the collective sector has attempted to enter the overseas markets as well. 
However, the result has not been satisfactory so far. Due to the emergence of 
the private sector, a series of practices have been adopted by the collective 
sector to boost up the sales. These measures include: increasing salespersons, 
providing very attractive bonuses and commission, avoiding direct competition, 
and ensuring to sell a port ion of products with the assistance of local 
government. 
5. Collective enterprises are very concerned with the maintenance of the 
capable personnel in their enterprises by offering various kinds of fringe benefits 
to the existing staff as well as penalties for those who leave. Generally speaking, 
most of the workers and managerial personnel prefer to work in the collective 
sector due to a better benefit package and job security. Using a self-reliant 
system, local officials' rewards are also linked to the performance of enterprises 
under their jurisdiction. This surely gives incentives for them to set top 
priority to the enterprises they run. 
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The above findings, show that the local governments and collective 
enterprises in Zhongshan are interdependent. From the perspective of collective 
enterprises, they are fully supported by local governments with different kinds of 
preferential treatment. Their consistent domination in the market is blessed by 
local governments. From the perspective of the local governments, the main 
income source is collective enterprises. For the interests of local governments 
and local communities, we have reasons to believe why local governments 
ensure a good prosperous development of the rural collective sector. 
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Chapter 4 
Policies of Local Governments on 
Rural Private Enterprises 
Since the legitimacy of the private sector in 1984，it becomes a new 
power to interact with collective enterprises in the rural market. Similar to the 
analytic order of previous chapter, the author will discuss the rural private 
enterprises (individual proprietorship and partnership enterprises) from five 
perspectives: license, finance (credit and loan, tax and levy), resource allocation 
(raw materials and land), marketing and labor. 
Though the private sector is theoretically not under the jurisdiction of 
local governments, the implementation of state and local policies highly affects 
the development of the private enterprise. By comparing the collective and 
private sectors, we can identify different features of both sectors. This chapter 
illustrates how the private sector is discriminated by the local government so 
that it only shares a minor portion of the market. 
1 License 
During the recovery stage (1978-83)，local cadres could use state 
policies that required peasants to stay in the teams and produce grain as an 
excuse for refusing a license to peasants for engaging in sideline work. ^  Backed 
by state policies, local governments had strong reasons to withhold the issue of a 
license. For example, no more than seven workers could be recruited when 
applying for a license. If the number of workers has exceeded the limit, special 
permission had to be granted by the local authority.^ 
After the administrative restructuring of rural authorities^ and the 
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legitimatization of the private sector declared by the central government in 1984, 
the restrictions on license became lax. In 1985, there were already 13,374 
individual proprietorships and partnership enterprises/ Central policy supported 
the growth of private sector and the number increased to 19,283 in 1988.5 
In the rapid development stage (1984-88), the rural reforms clearly 
removed many traditional sources of cadre power and also eliminated the 
position of production team leader.6 The constraints on the number of workers, 
technology transfer, knowhows recruitment, and raw materials supply were 
released. One was not required to follow the constraints when applying the 
license as in the recovery stage. This policy change let local cadres exercise 
their power in an indirect way. If cadres withheld licenses, they were acting 
aga ins t the s ta te d i rec t ives which encouraged indus t r i a l i za t ion , 
commercialization and entrepreneurship. Consequently, discrimination must be 
taken in more subtle forms. The nature of cadres power changed but the extent 
of license controlled by local government had not greatly been diminished 
although the state had legalized the status of private sector. ? Instead of denying 
a license right away, a cadre was able to create hindrances and the peasant will 
eventually give up due to time-consuming procedures. ICB could also issue 
temporary license so that regular renewal was required. 
During the rectification period (1989-1990)，the state controlled the 
overheating economy by giving directives to locality to cut down the number of 
license issued to rural enterprises. The private sector was affected the most 
when ICB limited the number of license. The license issued to individual 




After succeeding in getting a license, the financial capability of the firm 
is another major factor which affects its future development. Similar to the 
previous chapter, founding capital, credit and loan, tax and levy will be 
analyzed. 
2.1 Founding Capital 
The founding capital for individual proprietorship and partnership 
enterprises are formed by the savings of an individual or several households 
respectively. Founders may also borrow money from local and overseas 
relatives and friends, or from informal credit market. Recently the monetary-
requisition land fees redistributed by local governments can also provide people 
a substantial capital to set up their own business. 
In short, private enterprises did not rely on the community for capital. 
They have a low chance to obtain loan from local banks and credit cooperatives 
due to unfavorable banking policies to them. Only a few private large 
enterprises with close quanxi with important local cadres can get money from 
the sources more easily. 
As a whole, the individual savings of private enterprises cannot be 
compared with the entire population accumulation from the entire population of 
collective enterprises. Private enterprises have fewer channels than collective 
enterprises to acquire founding capital. Needless to say, the financial capability 
of collective enterprise is usually stronger than that of the private sector. The 
former has enjoyed comparative advantages in the beginning stage in terms of 
number of employees, facilities, assets etc. which ensure a higher productivity. 
Due to the limitation of capital，the private enterprises began in a relatively 
smaller size. 9 
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2.2 Credit and Loan 
After the relaxation of many governmental and party bureaucratic 
controls over the economy in 1984, banks have begun to play an increasingly 
important role in controlling investment pattern. State, collective, and private 
rural industries can apply for loans from the State Agriculture Bank while 
collective and private entrepreneurs can also borrow from the rural credit 
unions. Banks and rural credit unions, however, seldom loan to new private 
enterprises. As mentioned earlier, the founding capital always come from 
individuals' own savings, or from local or overseas relatives' borrowing. 
Thus，the scale of new private enterprises can hardly be compared with 
collective ones in the early stage. 
1986-88 was the period that the state adopted lax credit policy. During 
this period, state control on enterprises was so lax that many rural enterprises, 
particularly the private ones, grasped their golden opportunity to expand their 
businesses by getting funds f rom Agricultural Bank and rural credit 
cooperatives. The growth rate of output value of private enterprises during the 
above period was higher than those of other periods. One of the reasons was the 
financial assistance from banks and rural credit cooperatives for the firms' 
expansion. 
Private enterprises, however, have experienced some constraints of 
obtaining a loan to expand the business because they should be able to show the 
previous achievement records and they should have property or trustworthy 
institutions acting as guarantors.^^ Or they need to rely close relationship with 
bank officials. 
The attitude of local bank in this stage was different from the beginning 
stage in which banks and credit unions did not consider application from private 
enterprises at all. In the expansion stage of private enterprises, they stood in 
better chances to get bank loans than in their founding stage. 
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Facing financial diffimlty 
Whenever the state tightens its control over bank lending to rural 
enterprises, the first group to be affected is usually private enterprises which are 
deemed inefficient, redundant, and unwarranted; or those producing dangerous 
products and polluting the environment, u Such label are excuses to suspend a 
loan rather than a reflection of truth. In the rectification period (1989-90)， 
controls on bank loan quotas in rural areas seriously affected the volume of 
credit extended to pr ivate enterpr ises . Individual proprietorships and 
partnership enterprises always had to pay a higher credit interest rate or get no 
loan from bank. 12 
Local governments tried to rescue the problematic collective enterprises 
through banks' financial assistance. The survival of private enterprises, 
however, was not of top priority to banks. The banks seldom allowed delayed 
repayment for private enterprises. Offering additional loan had never occurred 
in the private sector. Therefore private enterprises had to repay on time or 
banks confiscated their property right away.^^ Nonetheless banks did not 
confiscate the property of collective enterprises if they did not repay on time and 
allowed them to delay the repayment. The ways adopted by private enterprises 
to deal with financial difficulties are as the follows: 
1. They search for new sources of funds by borrowing from overseas 
and local relatives or friends. 
2. They might get loan from informal credit organizations which usually 
charge the borrowers a higher interest rate than banks.^^ 
3. Another common way to obtain bank loan was to change their status 
into joint collective-private enterprises. If the amount of output value 
exceeding a certain limit may apply to convert their status namely as collective 
enterprises (village or township enterprises). Changing their status into 
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collective enterprises have increased the credibility of the firms so that it could 
have a better access to ask for loan�6 
4. The final solution for the defunct private enterprise was by selling off 
the assets of defunct enterprise such as factory building and equipment. In fact, 
a majority of private enterprises have adopted this method. The collapse rate of 
private enterprises to collective enterprises is about 1 to 15. The cost is fairly 
low for small-scale private enterprises to close down and reopen later due to low 
capital requirement. 17 
5. Several large private enterprises were able to look for funding by 
selling out the firm’ shares to workers and foreign investors like collective 
enterprises, for instance, Zhongshan Glass Industry Group Corporation, 
Zhongshan S & M Trust Trading General Company and Mark Cheung Hi-
fashion Ltd. Those small scale individual enterprises and partnership enterprises 
can hardly practice the share-holding system due to a limited number of 
workers and small assets.^^ 
2.3 Tax and Levy 
This section aims to explore problematic tax system on private sector 
which causes serious tax evasion, to identify the limited power of local 
governments on altering tax policy and to investigate how local governments 
collect extort ionate levies on private sector. The response of private 
entrepreneurs is also discussed. 
Problematic tax system 
With the rapid expansion of private marketing activity and the emergence 
of complicated ownerships of private enterprises, tax management become 
more difficult . In addition, the tax system itself in China is problematic. 
Taxation legislation for individual enterprises has only been introduced since 
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1986. 19 Even tax legislation today is still so weak that tax system cannot be 
effect ively implemented in private sector. The legal system for private 
enterprises has been It was widely accepted that private enterprises may 
not necessarily comply with the law. Actually, the problematic tax system did 
not clearly guide the private enterprises properly. Entrepreneurs could avoid 
public scrutiny of their private business affairs due to the insufficient qualified 
staff to monitor and control tax policies.21 This allows various forms of tax 
evasion. 
The state administrative departments, banks and tax bureaus are separate 
and do not cooperate or exchange information. Local tax departments and the 
Industrial and Commercial Bureau separately assess the income of enterprises 
and collect taxes and management fees from them separately as well. Different 
depar tments fear that their own benefits may be shared with others.^^ 
Therefore, they can cover up the information. Hence, it has passed the way for 
private entrepreneurs to evade too easily. 
Table 3 
Ten Grades of Income Tax Rate f〇「Private Enterprises in 1986 
Grade Annual Income (Yuan) 丁ax Rate (%) 
1 Less than 1000 7 
2 Between 1000 and 2000 15 
3 Between 2000 and 4000 25 
4 Between 4000 and 6000 30 
5 Between 6000 and 8000 35 
6 Between 8000 and 12000 40 
7 Between 12000 and 18000 45 
8 Between 18000 and 24000 50 
9 Between 24000 and 30000 55 
10 Over 30000 ^ 
Source: Shui Fa Zhi Shi Xue Shou Ce, edited and published by State 
Council, 1990, p.58. 
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Referring to Table 3, the lowest tax rate is 7 percent and the highest is 
60 percent. There is a large gap of tax rate up to 53 percent. Moreover, an 
extra 10-40 percent is charged if over 50,000 yuan per year.23 in 1988，the 
average tax rate for private enterprises also reached 35 percent.^^ The 
enterprises owner believed that the tax rate was so high and unreasonable that 
gave incentives for them to evade tax. 
Moreover, there are a few tax exemptions in private enterprises. The 
regulations listed for getting tax preferential treatments are fewer than those for 
collective enterprises. There are only three kinds of situation under which 
private enterprises can apply for special tax treatment. Firstly, when they 
utilize the residual materials for production. Secondly, when they suffer from 
natural disaster. Thirdly, when tax payers are under special circumstances. 
The third one can be interpreted subjectively by the author. Consequently, 
private enterprises almost have no chance to get tax reduction and exemption.^^ 
The inadequate legal tax system, insufficient administrative resources, 
uncoordinated state administration, relatively high tax rate and low chance of 
obtaining tax preferential treatment caused a serious tax evasion. 
Tax evasion 
Among all kinds of ownership in China private sector is the one which 
can enjoy the least preferential tax treatments. Tax exemption, tax reduction or 
tax break are seldom granted to private enterprises. Private entrepreneurs 
always feel being discriminated and have great incentives to evade taxes. 
In fact, private enterprises usually evade much of their tax liability. 
Tax collection is particularly hard to be implemented successfully because local 
governments do not take much initiatives to collect tax. It is similar to the 
attitude adopted by local governments toward state tax evasion on collective 
enterprises. The more tax they evade, the more they could retain for the local 
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economic development. It was estimated that Zhongshan private sector paid 40-
50 percent less than what they should have pay to the state.^^ There were a 
variety of ways to evade taxes by private enterprises. Some of them are as 
follows: 
1. Do not register at the Tax Bureau but only at the local Industrial and 
Commercial Bureau so that the enterprises may evade state tax.^^ 
2. Do not register in any of bureaus.^^ 
3. One household may run several businesses but he just registers one 
of them. Then he just pays one household of tax instead of several.^^ 
4. Several entrepreneurs share one license or one person rents out his 
license to another in order to be free from tax payment. 3o 
5. Even some private entrepreneurs operate businesses without license 
and avoid paying any taxes. This method is gradually not to be adopted 
because it would raise the suspicion of Industrial and Commercial Bureaus 
easily. 31 
6. Entrepreneurs always claim that their private enterprises are so small 
that they should not pay tax or just pay a small amount of tax. The smaller the 
firms and the lesser profit they earn. Hence, the lower tax rate will be charged. 
This strategy is so successful since the private enterprises' account is difficult to 
be assessed. Referring to Table 2，a wide gap exists between the two extreme 
tax rate. This is why they want to make themselves look smaller.^^ 
7. Though in principle all private enterprises are required to keep 
accounts and receipts, it is simply not possible to enforce this in practical terms. 
For the private sector, there was no tradition of book keeping. In the past the 
private sector was small both in numbers and in scale and many individual 
entrepreneurs were illiterate or otherwise unable to keep systematic accounts. 
They do not manage their businesses with book-keeping and budgeting, but by 
expe r i ence and f lex ib le day- to-day decisions traditionally.^^ Some 
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intentionally, however, avoid setting up an accounting system or issuing 
receipts. They destroy or falsify business records so that the government cannot 
accurately assess the amount to be taxed. ^ ^ 
8. Some enterprises even choose to close down due to reported losses as 
a way to evade taxat ion. Closing down a small prof i table individual 
proprietorship before paying taxes does not necessarily lead to a loss because the 
founding capital and initial investment is very limited. It is still profitable when 
the revenues plus the taxes keeping and then deduct the limited amount of 
founding capital and initial investment. ^ ^ 
9. The most common way is to change the ownership status. Big 
private enterprises register as collective or joint enterprises. Some local 
authorities borrow the name of collective enterprises to private sector not only 
to evade some taxes they should pay but also to enjoy more tax preferential 
treatments and retain the revenues for the interests of locality. Certainly those 
registered as collectively-owned enterprises, collectively-leased enterprises or 
collectively-contracted enterprises can gain substantial tax benefits.^^ For those 
private enterprises merging with collective enterprises tax is paid via the 
collective enterprises and charged the collective enterprise tax rate. 
The above just list some of the methods of tax evasion. Private 
enterprises do not merely use one method but may use several as a combination 
to ensure the success of evasion. 
Local government's limited power on taxes 
From the financial perspective, local governments differ from central 
government. It has virtually no discretionary authority to tax, and they cannot 
print m o n e y . 37 Provincial tax bureaus have the power to stipulate details 
regarding tax collection, exemptions and other policy issues, as allowed by the 
central level. But prefectural and city level bureaus have limited powers to 
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grant tax exemptions and holidays to local industries. Tax rate are all set up by 
central government and local government has no right to alter it. It turns out 
that local government has limited power to affect taxation on private enterprises. 
They cannot set up new tax rate. They have the right to charge levies 
locally. Theoretically speaking, levies are for the use of local social welfare 
and public expense. Levies collection constitutes a remarkable income. Under 
the financial self-reliance system, various local bureaus increase their financial 
reliance on levy collection from private enterprises. 
Extortionate levies 
A great number of levies were supposed to finance local administration 
and local public amenities. Redundant and onerous levies, however, are 
frequently imposed on private sector. Local fees vary in townships and villages. 
There is no official survey published on local fees paid by private rural 
enterprises. Local official said that there were only several items but private 
entrepreneurs argued that there were about 30-40 different kinds of fees. The 
individual proprietorships and partnership in some townships such as San Jiao, 
Lang Wang and Wu Qui Shan had to pay more than 80 items. The total levies 
paid by the nation's rural areas amounted to approximately 16 bil. yuan, which 
was three or four times of the state tax payment.^^ Furthermore, local 
authorities sometimes give a very short notice to private entrepreneurs about 
changing the collection of levies. Levy collection can be changed within one 
week. It is difficult for the private sector to adapt when local governments 
change the policy of local levies frequently and randomly, private enterprises 
will suffer from these abuses. 
Groups of peasants and private entrepreneurs in San Jiao township have 
tried to go to Guangdong Provincial Rural Enterprise Office to complain the 
extortionate levy collection.^^ There are too many kinds of levies. Some of 
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them are as the folio wings: 
Some local leaders charge private enterprises a high levy and additional 
items of levy to support the expense of local community. The general local 
levies include Public security levy, transportation levy, repair levy, registration 
levy，management levy, education levy, sanitation levy, street outlet levy, road 
levy, township and village levy and other doubtful levies. Various levies went 
to different bureaus. 
There are also some nonsensical fees such as spitting levy, family 
planning levy, dust levy, watermelon skin fine, obstruction of traffic fine, etc/o 
They are so r id iculous and the departments do not o f fe r any of these 
community services 
Donation 
Besides paying numerous kinds of levies, private entrepreneurs have to 
"donate" money to local authorities. This so-called "donation" is actually a kind 
of semi-compulsory levy payment. The purpose of such donation is to finance 
local projects. Local cadres usually refer to this action as a "fulfillment of 
social responsibility". 
These donations will be used on the social welfare like collective grain 
rations, subsidized education, taking care of childless old people, supporting 
poor households, building a bridge or a road, setting up a school, water, 
electricity etc.42 
This study's finding is, unlike Graham E. Johnson's argument that the 
donators are quite voluntary, 43 that they are usually the result of pressure from 
the local governmental authorities. Hence, it is consistent with David Zweig's 
o b s e r v a t i o n . 44 Private entrepreneurs wanted to ensure a smooth development 
of their enterprises by offering the so-called donation. If they refuse to donate, 
they will probably face various kinds of troubles. For instance, stricter and 
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more frequent inspection will be imposed on their firms. 
Response for private entrepreneurs 
Pr iva te rura l en te rpr i ses pay substant ia l levies . Many rural 
entrepreneurs are not well educated. They regard tax and levy payments as tax 
payment only. In fact, a substantial share of it is not state tax but local levies. 
The private sector has to pay many levies that entrepreneurs could not 
distinguish the purpose of one levy from another. They only knew that they 
were forced to give up a substantial portion of their income.45 in addition, levy 
collectors do not explain the difference between state tax and levy. Instead, the 
farmers or entrepreneurs are usually informed that the total payment is only 
state tax.46 This obviously confuses many rural tax payers. Though the private 
enterprises' regular tax payments and additional levies have increased in recent 
years, very little information is available for entrepreneurs to know how the tax 
and levy system actually operates in practice at the local l e v e l I t is extremely 
difficult to judge which items of levies are legal or not due to lack of specific 
regulations regarding to local levy collection. In fact, local governments 
manipulate the illiterate entrepreneurs and conceal the information from them. 
Excessive local levies on private enterprises have hindered their smooth 
development and might lead to the close down of business. Entrepreneurs have 
an obvious interest in reporting their actual tax burden but not their actual 
income. They complain that the tax burden ( levies indeed) is too heavy. 
Private entrepreneurs single out the exemptions and holidays given to the state 
and collective enterprises which cannot enjoy. Since they feel frustrated and 
unfairly treated, they use every means to get rid of these obligations by tax 
evasion. They said that the taxes (actually levies) were so heavy, which 
encourage them to corrupt tax collectors in order to evade tax. One private 
entrepreneur said, "If the bribery is far less than the amount of tax payment， 
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why not to bribe ？ T a x evasion reached a climax in late 1988 and 1989. A 
lengthy report by researchers from the State Council Research Office claimed 
that tax evasion had become a widespread problem. Analysts have already 
underestimated the amount of tax evas ion . Many private entrepreneurs cannot 
understand the functioning of the taxation system. At the same time, the 
extortionate levy collection push them onto the road of tax evasion. 
3 Resource Allocatinn 
Like the previous chapter, resource allocation discussed here also 
includes raw material supply and land use control. 
3.1 Raw Material 
In the recovery stage, it was difficult for individual household to get raw 
materials from the supply and marketing cooperatives which are collective-
owned.^^ Even there were some private retail outlets which could offer the 
needed inputs to other private household. Private retail was prohibited by the 
local authori t ies at that t ime. Central planning for supply was highly 
emphasized. 
Since the rural private sector obtained its legal status in 1984, the 
Supply and Market Bureau began to offer services to private enterprises. 
Private retailers were allowed to trade with private enterprises as well. Private 
enterprises, however, had to pay a higher prices to Market and Supply bureau to 
get necessary raw materials. Dissimilar to the policy implementation on 
collective sector, local governments do not secure any raw materials to private 
sector. Local governments usually do not help private sector when inputs are in 
shortage. Thus private sector mainly rely on the market rather than 
governmental planning for material supply. 
Collective enterprises, however, are blessed by local government. Good 
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quality and low-priced raw materials were first allocated to collective enterprises. 
If raw materials was in scarcity and under heavy demand in the local market, 
local authorities will practice control measures to secure a portion to collective 
enterprises and acquire necessary materials through neighboring cities by an 
"exchange policy".^^ The private enterprises somehow, however, had 
difficulties in purchasing raw materials in this critical period. However, those 
enterprises running processing and assembling business were not affected 
because they obtained the needed raw materials from overseas suppliers. 
3.2 Land 
Land is a big resource base. Before 1984，the right to use land was 
under the control of people's communes. After the administrative restructuring, 
village governments have become socialist landlords. They sold the right to use 
the land. They had the right both to conduct periodic inspections and to 
terminate contracts. The control on private sector is stricter than that of 
collective sector. ^ ^ 
Local leaders have this extremely important discretionary power to 
allocate land and control the purpose of land use. When the land was leased 
out, land contracts could not be transferred to a third party privately. In other 
words, land transaction among peasants had to be approved by local leaders.^^ 
Furthermore, the contractor himself cannot change the land usage specified on 
the agreement without the permission of local government. Peasants cannot set 
up or allow another party to set up individual factories on their own agricultural 
land. 
In Zhongshan, most of private enterprises were small individual firms or 
household run factories. They occupied some pots of land which were 
contracted by local governments. As local cadres are aware that enterprises are 
making a higher profit than they expected, they would try to raise the contract 
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fees by breaking the original agreement. In order to copy with this unreasonable 
policy, some firm owners prefer to use their homes as production site.54 
As the private enterprises continue to expand, however, some of them 
have difficulty in looking for ideal land. They will consider factors such as the 
cost of the land, proximity to the market center, transportation, electricity and 
water supply, in choosing their sites. 
A comparatively higher rate for buying the right of land use was charged 
from private enterprises than that charged in the collective sector. The cost of 
land will also based on the its location. The nearer the public road, the higher 
price of the land would be. Small factories of individual enterprises were 
usually allocated a piece of land far from market center. The transportation 
network was not as good as that of collective enterprises. Fortunately, 
electricity and water supply in Zhongshan was generally good and much 
improved b e f o r e . Based on most of the above defects, more firms gradually 
preferred to set up their operations in small towns and accordingly tried to rent 
public or private buildings as production site. 
Land requisition 
As the development of industrial enterprises requires more land, the 
agricultural land are purchased from peasants. The National Law of 1978 
announced, "The state may requisition by purchase, take over for use, or 
nationalize land under conditions prescribed by law. "56 Peasants did not receive 
certain compensation until the end of the 80s.57 It was mainly because foreign 
investors have bought plots of land for building industrial factory. Investors 
might pay considerable land use charge and land management fee to local 
governments. Some of the money were then redistribute as part of the 
requisition-fees to peasants. 
Only 20-30 percent of the total income of land selling was given to 
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peasant. In other words, about 70 percent was kept in a local "public-land 
funding". The local cadres said that the purpose of the funding was to build 
public facilities, to develop industry, and to construct apartment for local 
peasants in the community. The administrative system has great loopholes for 
corruption. There is no government department that oversees how local 
governments utilize the land funds. The head of township or village directly 
contact the foreign investor to negotiate the land leasing. Peasants can neither 
participate in any stage during the talk nor affect the decision. The operation is 
not a open and democratic system. Peasants in Zhang Jiabian township have 
complained that requisition fees is unreasonably distributed. For example, one 
mu of commercial and industrial land cost 160,000 yuan when sold to foreign 
investor. Peasants, however, could only get 20,000 yuan per mu.^^ 
Generally speaking, although a majority of amount was retained by 
government, many peasants still feel that what they get was already a great 
lump sum of money. Thus, poor village may become rich village after selling 
out a number of the plots of land. A poor peasant may become rich peasant 
after getting monetary land requisition fees. Many peasants have indeed started 
their individual proprietorships or partnership enterprises with several friends 
after getting land requisition fees. 
For those still owning some farmland, many peasants have gradually 
entered local rural enterprises. They either sold out their land or contracted to 
other peasants through the permission of local government.6�This is called as 
"leave the farmland but not leave the village or township ( 離土不離绪g )•" 




The number of labor hired used to be highly restrained. Private and 
commercial households are allowed to hire only two helpers and three to five 
apprentices in the recovery stage. The Central Committee's Document No. 1 of 
1984 gradually allowed private firms to hire more labor without restrictions on 
them. 
In 1990, the number of labor employed in private enterprises reached 
65，498 which was about one third of the number in collective enterprises. The 
private sector has gradually played an important role for labor absorption though 
not as much as collective enterprises. For example, some private enterprises, 
having over million assets，such as Jian Hua Industry Ltd., Rongan Industry 
Ltd. and Wei yeiye Industry Ltd. employ several hundreds of people 
respectively in Zhongshan. ^ ^ 
Regarding the job opportunity in Zhongshan, private enterprises do not 
have the obligation to be bound by the local Employment Guidelines^^ that the 
priority of recruitment should be allocated to local people. A cadre in the 
Zhongshan Labor Bureau demonstrated that collective enterprises basically 
followed the guidelines to consider local people to fill up vacancies. They 
would employ outsiders only if particular skillful workers are not able to be 
recruited locally. The partnership enterprises and individual proprietorships, 
however, do not stick to the guidelines which do not have binding power on 
them. Guidelines merely functioned as a piece of advice they did not listen to. 
Transient labor 
Transient labor refers to those immigrants from provinces in interior 
areas. In fact, a majority of workers employed by the private sector are 
immigrants. The factor private entrepreneurs take into account is not to 
promote local job opportunity or social welfare but to maximize the profit with 
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the cheapest labor force. With the high administrative autonomy for the 
enterprises, private enterprises always prefer to hire immigrants as workers 
rather than local people for the sake of low wage. Many of them, however, are 
not skilled workers. This can affect the quality of products and efficiency of 
enterprise operation. 
Several visits to private factories by the author reveal that the working 
conditions for labor are relatively poor. There is insufficient safety precaution 
for machine operation, polluted environment, poor air conditions and no fire 
precaution at all. The dormitory is congested by a row of 15 beds and with 
four walls without basic facilities and sanitary outlets.^^ Some factories even 
operate days and evenings and the factory workers said that one bed had to be 
shared with two persons; one day time worker and one evening time worker. 
The entrepreneurs can save more money by providing less accommodations. 
Furthermore, some workers expressed that it was very common for them to 
work overtime without compensation. They have worked for 12 to 16 hours 
daily and occasionally on Sunday as well. There are only a few days of 
holidays a year. 64 
The payments can be as low as 1 yuan per hour without any allowance 
and benefits. Workers cannot expect the benefits which can be enjoyed in 
collective enterprises. What they can get is just a net salary ranging from 300 
to 600 yuan per month. Delay in paying wages and reduction of wages due to 
trivial matters always occur . 65 Though collective enterprises offer similar 
amount of salary to workers, it functions as the basic salary. Other kinds of 
al lowance and extra stipends can be enjoyed by workers in collective 
enterprises. 
For the interest of private employers, they usually hire immigrants on 
temporary status rather than contract or permanent status since they do not need 
to provide extra benefits. Employers can replace the workers at any time they 
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like，especially in the pe r iod a f t e r Chinese new year. Despi te such 
exploitations, transient population still prefer to stay and work rather than go 
back to their home towns in interior area and become jobless. 
The government has already noticed this phenomenon and announced a 
regulation very early, Item six of Document No. 1 (1983) by State Council 
mentioned that any exploitation of workers was not allowed.^^ However, it was 
clear that the regulations were not enforced. It is easy to understand why labor 
prefer to choose collective enterprises as their first choice. 
Managerial personnel 
Some private enterprises tried to offer higher informal pays than the 
collective sector does to attract technicians, skilled labor and especially 
managerial personnel. It has given pressure for collective enterprises to 
consolidate the work teams by undertaking a series of reform. Nonetheless the 
private enterprises also has its weaknesses in competing human resources. For 
instance, the pay is unstable though it is high. Bonus and commission fluctuate 
every month. Secondly, the short history and high collapse rate of the private 
sector give weak confidence for managerial personnel to shift form one to 
another. Thirdly, managerial personnel, technicians and skilled workers in the 
collective sector have enjoyed a stable and remarkable welfare package. 
Retirement pension is one of the attractive benefits. They doubt whether the 
private enterprises still exist when they retired.^^ Consequently, the threat of 
competing human resource to collective enterprises is limited. In other words, 




Since 1978, Production Responsibility System brought an increase in 
personal income and investment which generated higher demand for 
consumption. In 1984，the increasing size and changing administrative structure 
of the rural area has created opportunities and market niches for private 
enterprises. When collective enterprises could not fulfill the market demand, 
private enterprises could fill up the gap. Though the gradual liberation of the 
private enterprise to a certain extent create a competition with collective 
enterprises in the market, it still acted as an supplementary economy to the later. 
Its market channels are still narrower than collective enterprises. 
Concerning the output value of both sectors, the data show that private 
enterprises still occupied a limited market share. Private enterprises' products 
were occasionally plagued by lower technological levels and poorer quality 
comparing with collective ones. In order to attract customers, they may set a 
lower price than that of the collective sector. They prefer to earn more by 
selling more. Private enterprises sometimes have to sell their products on credit 
and receive payment after delay or get no payment. ^ ^ 
Though the network is not as wide as collective enterprises connecting 
to interior market, the private sector's product sales to interior region is still 
quite profitable. In the domestic market, only a few whose assets over millions 
is able to compete with collective enterprises. In other words, the private 
sector always plays the role to fill up the gaps left by collective enterprises. 
Furthermore, local governments would never help the private sector to sell out a 
quota of products but do so on collective sector. This is another "tilt" policy 
implementation between them. 
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Diversification 
The pr iva te sector economy was tradit ionally more divers i f ied. 
Diversification indeed is a kind of strategy to survive in the market. As private 
enterprises mainly depends on market rather than government planning for its 
survival and development, they need to adapt to the rapidly changing market 
and responded quickly. 
Private enterprises have shown great flexibility in developing new 
products and change product lines quickly to avoid being stuck too long in one 
industry that might face declining market trends. It is a general phenomenon in 
Zhongshan that private enterprises possess a sharper sense to the market change 
(demand of customers) than collective enterprises. They can sense what is the 
most fashionable product and respond by changing their product line very 
fast.69 The low capital can easily be switched into another product line. 
It is much easier for a small individual enterprise to institute a radical 
change than a large-scale collective enterprises. This is what Chinese people 
called, "big boat (refer collective enterprise) can resist wave but small boat 
(refer private enterprise) can turn around quickly.”(船大檔風浪，船小好調頭） 
The second half of the statement means that exit or adjustment is relatively 
painless for private enterprises because capital requirements are low and assets 
can easily be shifted to other lines of b u s i n e s s . T h e adjustments can include 
price and quantity of products. Based on a relatively small capital and 
investment, they adopt a conglomerate strategy which can greatly reduce market 
risk by not specializing only on a single kind of product. Therefore, private 
enterprises appear to be diversified in terms of their products.^^ It is different 
from collective enterprises's specialized-oriented strategy. On the other hand, 




Since the emergence of the private sector in Zhongshan, it has a small 
share in the market. This chapter is to bring out the reasons for this development 
pattern. Local governments in Zhongshan adopt discriminated treatments 
toward private enterprises. The implementation of policy discussed from the 
following five perspectives (license, finance, resource allocation, employees and 
marketing) has shown a suppression of private sector by local governments. 
1. License: Local authorities would directly refuse to issue a license to 
individual household in early stage. Since the removal of old sources of cadre 
power by reform, the way to block the issue of license changes into more 
subtle forms, for instance, the applicant may need a longer time in application; 
the cadre may blame the proposed business as overheated in the market or the 
business will pollute the environment etc. Industrial and Commercial Bureau 
effectively controls the number of specific kinds of private enterprises which 
may give severe competition to collective enterprises. 
2. Finance: Founding capital of individual proprietorships and partner-
ship enterprises cannot be compared with that of the collective enterprises� 
Loans to private enterprises in the beginning stage and difficult stage are 
extremely rare. Local banks, however, gradually release loan to some big and 
medium size enterprises in their expansion stage if sufficient property or trust-
worthy guarantors support the debtor. 
The problematic tax system and insufficient tax collectors induce serious 
tax evasion in the private sector. Local governments have imposed extortionate 
levies and ask for donat ions on pr ivate en te rpr i ses . Though pr ivate 
entrepreneurs strongly oppose this, there seems to be no improvement at all. 
Some entrepreneurs prefer to bribe rather than to pay. And some local bureaus 
continue to add items of levies, which hinders enterprise development and leads 
to shut down. 
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3. Resource allocation: Private enterprises have to find raw materials for 
themselves. Dissimilar to collective enterprises, local governments do not secure 
any portion for the private sector at all. If raw material is in scarcity in the 
market，private enterprises usually become the victim to suffer from supply 
shortage because local governments practice measures to allocate the necessary 
materials first to collective enterprises under their jurisdiction. 
Compared with collective enterprises, private enterprises are allocated 
the land which is not so near to the market center. Local cadres attempt to 
make extra profits for themselves when they lease out the land to private 
entrepreneurs. Sometimes local cadres may break some terms in the contract in 
order to maximize their benefits. Thus, more private enterprises gradually set 
up their operations by renting a public or private building. 
Many private entrepreneurs were previously peasants or still are 
peasants. Though they can obtain land requisition fees distributed by local 
governments, the method of calculation is unknown and the distribution is 
probably unfair to them since a large portion of requisition fees is retained in the 
local governments without proper auditing. 
4. Employee: Due to the relaxation of restriction on the number of 
employees in private enterprises, private sector hire many immigrants rather 
than local people as workers due to cheap wages. Exploitations on immigrant 
labor are serious. On the other hand, the private sector intends to offer high 
informal pays to recruit managerial personnel, technicians and skilled labor. The 
payments, however, are not stable and people have a low confidence on private 
enterprises. In addition, the collective enterprises have practiced some measures 
to reward the stayers and penalize the leavers so that the rate shifted to 
collective enterprises is very low. Both workers and managerial personnel still 
prefer to work in collective sector due to a better job security and welfare 
package. 
107 
5. Marketing: The competitiveness of private enterprises is not as strong 
as collective enterprises. However, based on swift response to market change 
(change of customers' taste), this diversification strategy is good for private 
sector because the small capital investment makes them more flexible in produc-
tion. This allows them to shift to a new profitable product line quickly without 
a big loss. Of course, the economic scale is not as good as the specification 
strategy of collective enterprises. 
As a whole, local governments have interdependent relationships with 
collective enterprises, the former will provide preferential treatments to the 
latter. Discriminated practices, however, can be found to the private sector if it 
may threaten the posi t ion of collective one. Therefore , the policies 
implemented by local cadres do not lead to a prosperous development of the 
rural private enterprises in Zhongshan. 
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In this research, it is found that collective enterprises have predominated 
over private enterprises in terms of gross output value, number of employees 
hired，fixed asset value, gross income and tax payment in the period between 
1984 and 1990 in Zhongshan City. Although there are far fewer collective 
enterprises than private enterprises, the large-scale collective enterprises have 
played a chief economic role in Zhongshan City. 
On the contrary, rural private enterprises have merely acted as a 
supplementary economic force to the collective sector. Local governments 
promote such a development pattern for the following reasons: 
Firstly, local governments are the owners of collective enterprises. The 
p e r f o r m a n c e of en terpr i ses direct ly cor re la te to the interest of local 
governments. It is natural for them to give priority to promote their own 
enterprise development. Local governments, however, do not have asset on 
private enterprises and so the former usually do not expect much revenue from 
the later. 
Secondly, as a representative of the community, local governments is 
expected to provide social welfare services to the community. Large proportion 
of government expenditure comes from the revenues of collective enterprises. 
Therefore, maintaining the good prospect of collective enterprises directly 
influences social welfare provision. If collective enterprises fail to provide 
sufficient income to local governments, their operations will be problematic. 
Thirdly, the data shows that collective enterprises are the main 
employers providing job opportunities to local people. Its labor absorption 
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ability is much stronger than that of the private sector. Furthermore, the private 
sector usually employs outsiders as workers. Thus, local governments reduce 
the local unemployment rate by promoting collective enterprises. 
Fourthly, some local official leaders are the directors of boards of 
collective enterprises. They are both businessmen and cadres. This gives 
incentives to them to run their enterprises with great effort. 
Fifthly，concerning local leaders' continual stay in office, economic 
achievement is increasingly important whether they are appointed or nominated. 
From the view point of local people, the affluence of the local community is 
their utmost. From the view point of higher authorities, taking income from 
profitable collective enterprises is most important. Since profitable collective 
enterprises can ensure local affluence and provide sufficient payment to higher 
authorities, local leaders try their best to maintain the good performance of the 
collective sector because this enhances their continual stay in office. 
Sixthly，there are three kinds of ownerships in China. They are public 
ownership for state enterprises, collective ownership for collective enterprises 
and private ownership for private enterprises. Among them, the first one has 
clearly declined but the second and third have gradually played important roles 
in the national economy of China. Concentrating energy in promoting state 
enterprises is no longer a good strategy. Instead, promoting collective 
enterprises is an acceptable choice. 
\ Finally, people are less resistant to the notion of collective ownership 
than the notion of private ownership. The former is still compatible to the 
doctrine of Marxism-Lenisim and Mao-Zedong Thought. Private enterprises are 
somewhat contradictory to the traditional value of China. ^ Though private 
enterprises have begun to achieve a significant growth in some places of China, 
the local cadres in Zhongshan still worry about any political wind from the 
central government towards the private sector. Thus, the safest way is to 
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promote collective enterprises; it is free from any political risk and is more 
profitable in the market. 
By implementing ” on rural enterprises, local governments successfully 
control the development pattern of rural enterprises in a way that they wish. 
The policies implemented by local governments have favored collective 
enterprises but discriminated against private ones from 1978 to 1990. The 
policies can be evaluated from the following five perspectives which include 
license，finance (founding capital, credit and loan, tax and levy), resource 
allocation (raw materials and land), employees and marketing. 
1 License 
Getting a license is the first and foremost step to enter the market. The 
Industrial and Commercial Bureau (ICB) is responsible for issuing a license. 
Being the subordinate department of a local government, collective enterprises 
require a simpler procedure and shorter time to apply for a license. Their 
application is seldom rejected. The entrance of private enterprises into 
market, however, is still under the control of the ICB. Though the nature of 
cadre power has changed into a more subtle form, they can still repel private 
enterprises' entrance by subjective excuses. 
2 Finance 
Collective enterprises obtain their founding capital from four sources: 
accumulation from communes and brigades and now from village and township 
governments; selling land (the right of use only) to foreign investors; borrowing 
form local banks and rural credit cooperatives; accumulation from local 
residents. Founding capital of private enterprises, however, come merely from 
ent repreneurs ' own savings or borrowings f rom relatives and f r iends . 
Redistribution of land requisition fee may gradually provide another modest 
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source of founding capital. As a whole, the scale of private enterprises at the 
beginning stage is much smaller than that of collective enterprises. 
Local governments provide an intangible assistance to collective 
enterprises by being a trustworthy guarantor. Local governments always use 
their influence to help collective firms obtain bank loans. Furthermore, the 
"risk sharing system" adopted by the local governments give a strong confidence 
to banks and rural credit unions. However, private enterprises face difficulties 
and constraints while asking for loan from banks especially at the founding 
stage. They can only deal with the nonofficial credit unions which charge them 
a higher interest rate. At the end of the 80s，banking institutions have begun to 
release loan to some relatively bigger enterprises in their expansion stage. 
Regarding the tax policy, collective enterprises can enjoy preferential 
treatments of tax exemption, tax reduction and tax breaks. Private enterprises 
are unlikely accessible to those benefits. Moreover, extortionate levy and 
donations were encroached upon them. Thus, there is a greater impetus for 
private entrepreneurs to undergo tax evasion. In addition, the problematic tax 
system and insufficient tax collectors give a higher incentive for them to do so. 
3 Resource allocation 
Some raw materials supply are under the management of the Supply and 
Market Bureau. Collective enterprises can get a lower-than-market price and 
good-quality inputs. When there is a shortage of raw materials, local 
governments usually give priority to collective enterprises at the expense of 
private ones. Furthermore, they will try to exchange needed inputs with other 
regions based on their wide network. 
If collective enterprises buy or lease the land which is under the 
jurisdiction of the same local government, they are allocated plots of land with 
shorter distance form the market center. A longer term and lower rate is also 
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granted when leasing a piece of land. Private enterprises lack the above 
advantages. On the contrary, local cadres try to make extra profits form private 
entrepreneurs. Local cadres can break the contract in order to maximize their 
own interests. Furthermore, many private entrepreneurs in rural areas are 
previous peasants or currently peasants. Land requisition fees has been 
occasionally distributed unreasonably to peasants. A substantial portion of 
income from selling land is retained in the local governments as "public land 
funding" but lack of auditing. 
4 Employee 
Since the relaxation of restriction on the number of employees in the 
private sector, it hires plenty of transient population rather than local people as 
labor. Exploitation on transient labor is serious. Poor working and living 
condition, very long working hours, underpayment, insufficient welfare 
compensation, etc. are all prevalent problems existing in private enterprises. 
Despite all these, factories run by private entrepreneurs still attract numerous 
transient labor. Comparatively speaking, collective enterprises provide a better 
package and job security to their employees, especially the managerial and 
technical personnel, and skilled labor. Although the private sector has offered 
higher informal payments to attract staff, it was not effective. This is due to the 
unstable income, low confidence on private enterprises and some policies taken 
by collective enterprises to consolidate their work team by penalizing the leavers 
and rewarding the stayers. Collective enterprises are concerned about keeping 
up a team of capable human resource base and maintaining their 
competitiveness in the market. 
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5 Marketing 
This final aspect shows that both collective and private sectors target at the 
interior and domestic markets for their profits. Based on the wide network of 
local governments with other regions, they usually help sell a portion of 
products of collective enterprises. After the private sector has participated in 
the market, collective enterprises have upgraded their marketability by 
increasing salespersons, providing attractive bonuses and commission. On the 
other side, the private sector is not as competitive as the collective sector. 
Private enterprises, however, have an advantage that they are quick to respond 
to market changes. Unlike the large capital of collective enterprises, the small 
capital of private enterprises makes it almost painless for them to shift product 
lines from one to another. Their diversification strategy helps them maintain 
certain market share. The disadvantage, however, is that the economic scale is 
not as good as the specification strategy of collective enterprises. 
As a whole, the above perspectives of "tilt policies" demonstrate how 
local governments support and give their primary attention to collective 
enterprises and discriminate against the private sector. An unfair competition 
and de facto discrimination exist between the two kinds of ownership in the 
market. Therefore, collective enterprises have economically predominated over 
private enterprises in the development pattern of rural enterprises. 
In response to some previous studies by other scholars, both Oi and this 
study are not chiefly concerned with the role of the central state in the vertical 
integration of interests within society as a whole. Instead, we limit our discus-
sion to an examination of local governments at the township and village levels 
since they are the lowest levels of governments and most directly involved in 
rural industrialization. Oi (1992) suggests that the rural economic development 
relies heavily on the role played by local governments through rural collective 
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enterprises. This case confirms Oi ,s analytical framework. Besides, Oi also 
offers a comprehensive work on analyzing the relationship between local 
government and rural enterprises in a macro perspective in whole of China. Oi 
devotes much effort in describing the financial issue of tax and credit but seldom 
addresses the research problem from other aspects. This study supplements Oi's 
work by providing other perspectives such as license, marketing and labor. 
Thus offering a more comprehensive view to the understanding of the policy 
implementation of local governments on rural collective enterprises. 
The Wenzhou case of Liu Yia-ling presents a counter example to Oi. 
Liu believes that the prosperity of local economy is mainly attributed to the 
affluent private enterprises. She does not give much credit to the role of local 
governments. She suggests that local governments in Wenzhou just exercises 
lassie-faire policy but do not invest or put much effort on boosting up private 
sector although she agrees that the sheltering policy serves to promote local 
development.^ This study comes to contrast with Liu's. This study shows that 
local governments play a decisive role on local economic development. 
Moreover , the private sector has merely played a minor role on local 
community development compared with the collective sector in Zhongshan. 
Therefore this study argues that Liu underestimates the role of the local 
government. In fact, if local governments dare not take the risk and adjust to 
the central political winds, private enterprises can hardly grow up. Even if local 
governments do not invest in private enterprises, the latter ,s survival and fate 
are still dependent on the former. 
Though a legal status for private enterprises has been granted by the 
central government since 1984，this study shows that the rural area in 
Zhongshan still lacks the concept of privatization especially in the 80s. This is 
concurs with similar to Elliot Berg's argument that China's economy has been 
progressing without true privatization.^ Ody (1991) and Perkins (1988) add 
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that it is a kind of incomplete nature of market-oriented reforms in rural China/ 
The so-called "four wheels running together"^ is untrue. The discriminated 
practices on private enterprises show that the marketization and privatization 
are quite limited in Zhongshan in the period studied. Local governments do not 
provide a fair environment for private enterprises to compete in the market. 
There is no real privatization in Zhongshan in the period studied since 
the coordination and intervention from local governments continue, though, 
some collective firms are contracted or leased to factory managers. The main 
decision power still rests in the hand of local cadres. This shows that 
privatization is not an important feature of the Chinese industrial scene. At least 
90 percent of incremental industrial production during the 1980s came from 
state and collective firms that have no private owners.6 At that time, collective 
enterprises relatively monopolize market and no other type of ownership would 
threaten its position at that time. 
Stepping into the 90s，some important events, however, have happened: 
the South China tour of Deng Xiaoping in the beginning of 1992，the declaration 
of "Socialist Market Economy" in the Fourteen People's Congress in 1993，and 
the "Tax Reform" at the beginning of 1994. These events have led a big 
progress to a market economy. These changes have also created more space 
and better environment for the private sector to develop. The above-mentioned 
aspects (license, finance, resource allocation, employees and marketing) 
investigated in Zhongshan have changed accordingly. For example, managerial 
personnel in collective enterprises have further redirected their energies 
towards market rather than to rely on the government planning, towards 
innovation rather than routine. This creates a positive pressure for collective 
enterprises to improve their efficiency. 
Based on Lina (1990) ’s findings, however, collective enterprises share 
quite a lot of characteristics with state-owned enterprises. The relationship 
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between local governments and collective enterprises is similar to the 
relationship between higher level governments and state enterprises. Both have 
ownership rights over the assets of their subordinate firms and depend on them 
for revenue. Both have functional similarities in the management of subordinate 
enterprises by using administrative restraints to suppress the opponents and 
promote themselves.^ Both have dual roles in keeping enterprises profitable 
(state enterprises fail to achieve this goal) and providing social welfare to 
community at the same time. Collective enterprises are just like "small state 
enterprises." As we know that state enterprises in China can no longer have a 
good profit. One wonders whether the collective enterprises may also step on 
the sunset road of state enterprises. 
In add i t i on , co l lec t ive en te rpr i ses may also su f f e r f rom their 
shor tcomings too : f iscal p reda t ion^ unbalanced d e v e l o p m e n t � l o w 
accumula t ion^^ slow responsiveness to market^，overstaffing^^, big 
government consumption expenses.^^ In the long run, the author forecasts that 
these defects can hamper the efficiency of collective enterprises. It enhances the 
possibility that collective enterprises may become less important than it was in 
the 80's in rural economic development. 
Finally, the development of rural enterprises has changed rapidly to a 
new page in the early 90s. There are still questions relating to the future 
development of rural enterprises in China which can be investigated furthered. 
For example, what is the development pattern of rural enterprises in the 90s? 
Will collective enterprises maintain its dominating position in the rural areas? 
Are private enterprises able to compete with collective enterprises? These 
questions may suggest the future direction of conducting research in such aspect. 
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Appendix 1 
List of Interviewees 
1. Cadre in Supply and Market Bureau, December, 1992. 
2. Official in Agricultural Bank, December, 1992. 
3. Private entrepreneur, rural textile factory, December, 1992. 
4. Owner of partnership enterprise (shoe making factory), December, 1992. 
5. Local tax collector, January, 1993. 
6. Clerk working in rural credit union, January, 1993. 
7. Cadre in City Tax Bureau，May, 1993. 
8. Village party secretary, May, 1993. 
9. Village government leader, May 1993 and May 1994. 
10. Senior cadre in Labor Bureau, May, 1993. 
11. Cadre in City Rural Policy Office，June 1993 & May 1994. 
12. Township government head, June, 1993. 
13. Private entrepreneur, retail sales, June, 1993. 
14. Individual entrepreneur, translation service, June, 1993. 
15. Skilled labor, township enterprise (plastic and rubber factory), June, 1993. 
16. Township leader, also being director of board in collective enterprise (textile 
company), July, 1993. 
17. Senior cadre working in Industrial and Commercial Bureau (IBC) July 
1994. 
18. Senior cadre in Rural Enterprise Management Bureau, July 1993. 
19. Private entrepreneur, household clothing industry, July, 1993. 
20. Owner of partnership enterprise ( fruit shop), July, 1993. 
21. Manger, village enterprise (hardware factory), July 1993 & May 1994. 
22. Skilled worker, township enterprise (plastic and rubber), June, 1993. 
23. Five workers, village enterprise (cobbler), July, 1993. 
24. Salesperson working in township enterprise (clothing), July, 1993. 
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25. Supervisor, village enterprise (paper making), July, 1993. 
26. Cadre in local Statistical Bureau, August, 1993, 
27. Cadre in local Land Bureau, August, 1993. 
28. Many^er in ^ township enterprise (arts and crafts import & export company), 
29. 二 J 1 器穿er，Collective enterprise (real estate development company), 
30. Manager township enterprise (processing and assembling business) Au-
gust, 1993. 
31. Sen ig engineer, township enterprise (electronic parts company), August, 
32. Three workers in private enterprise (leather and garment), August, 1993. 
33. Scholar, Zhongshan University, August 1993 and May 1994. 
34. Vice Principle in Communist Party School in Zhongshan City, August 1993 
and May 1994. 
35. Tailor in private enterprise, August, 1993. 
36. Three local citizens, May, 1994. 
37. Two peasants (individual entrepreneurs as well), May 1994. 
38. Tech^nician, village enterprise (agricultural chemical fertilizers), August, 
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Appendix 2 
The Development of Rural Enterprises in Zhongshan in Mao-Era 
Before 1949 - Zhongshan,s rural areas had only a few workshops and industries to produce sugar and some simple handicrafts. 
Since 1949 - family sideline production developed rapidly. 
1954 - In one of the townships “ Shih Qi, “ there were eleven nandicrafters unemployed and then formed the first cooperative production team m the whole county. In the following two years, more than 160 cooperative production teams on handicraft were emerging. Some of the peasants had taken part-time jobs in this commercialized handicraft industry. 
„ 1956 - On 15 January, "Zhongshan County Handicraft Production Union 
was formally established by Zhongshan Handicraft Commune Representatives. 
In June, there were 206 unions established and 6259 people engaged in this 
field. Farmers who were working part-time in handicraft industry tried to 
organize the sideline production teams into specialized handicraft unions. 
1957 - Local government helped to develop handicraft unions. 
1958 - China adopted the "Great Leap Forward" strategy by building 
people, s communes which swept across the vast rural areas. The people's 
communes established a large number of commune and brigade enterprises by 
absorbing manpower, funds, and materials from the unions previously built. 
1960 - the Central Committee of the Communist Party and the central government called for readjustment of the national economy and began to review such communization campaign. This led to discontinued operations of many commune and brigade enterprises. 
1961-63 - Some commune and brigade enterprises returned to production teams. Some were changed into handicraft cooperatives again, and the rest were closed. 
1964-74 - During the Cultural Revolution, these enterprises were criticized as running the road of capitalism so that many of them were forced to halt operation and the rest remained stagnant. This was the most difficult period for the rural enterprise development. 
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